The decision of India’s prime minister Manmohan Singh to meet the Hurriyat leadership is a dubious first. In his time Atal Behari Vajpayee had wisely resisted the idea of dealing directly with the Hurriyat though his positive moves in respect of Kashmir had opened up the space for reaching a truce with the people, above all by ensuring a fair assembly election that was acclaimed within the Valley and way beyond.

Naturally, no representative government can decline to discuss issues with any section of the people, no matter what their grievances, aims, or demands. But must the conversation proceed at the level of prime minister in order to be deemed genuine? Besides, the Hurriyat brings nothing to the table. Also, since Singh has sought to engage the Hurriyat directly, why not, let’s say, also the Naxalites, should they make that demand? Indeed, the ULFA has already done that. Like them, the Hurriyat is quite clear that no process of discussion can influence its aims. The original Hurriyat has split. The section led by Ali Shah Geelani, which propagates Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan, repudiates the very idea of talking with the government until the Indian state comes to view Kashmir as “disputed territory”. Other breakaway elements, most notably Yasin Malik’s JKLF that grandiloquently speaks of “independence” for all of J&K (including areas under Pakistan control), have also skipped the talks. These, rather than the Mirwaiz’s, are the more influential Hurriyat sections. The Mirwaiz and his friends command neither “fire-power” nor stand at the head of people’s power in Kashmir. Small wonder that all that the Mirwaiz found possible to say before meeting Singh is that the interaction of his group with the prime minister will signal for the first time that the people of Kashmir have at last become a party to the discussion on the status of Kashmir. The flagrant sub-text here is that the Mirwaiz’s Hurriyat is the true voice of Kashmir.

This, of course, is being economical with the truth and would make the Kashmiris guffaw. For the move to be meaningful, it should deliver at least on one of three counts: draw India and Pakistan closer; draw the people of Kashmir—who have been through an unimaginable trauma—closer to the Centre; gain India points in counsels of the world for talking to secessionist elements. Indeed, it will be extraordinary if any of these goals is met.

Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir essentially flows from its understanding of the two-nation theory. The start of a process of discussion between the Indian leadership at the highest level and Kashmir’s secessionist conglomerate can only boost hopes in Islamabad. It could even lead to Pakistan dragging its feet even more on its composite dialogue with India. As for deepening the truce with the people of the Valley, the prime minister’s move vis-à-vis the Hurriyat is unlikely to be noted as an act of bridge-building. It is then hard to see how India is going to earn the gratitude of the power-brokers of the world when it talks to a marginalised Kashmiri set that play no part in calming the Valley.

Sahay is a visiting professor at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi