Uncertainty looms over the political horizon of Nepal. While in a liberal democracy citizenship rights are well protected, Nepal’s politics presents an incremental model with incapable

political actors, inefficient political system and public sector, and impunity when it comes to obeying the rule of law. Family capitalism, clientelistic culture, and formidable presence of political dinosaurs are other factors crippling Nepal’s political machinery. The ruling elites are exploiting policy discourses, rules of the game and resources when an entire generation of politicians has been affected by what Barber calls ‘thin democracy’ or too little democracy. The ‘struggle for democracy’ should be understood in this context.

All societies have to struggle for their radical transformation. But true democracy cannot be achieved only by dethroning a dictator. The bitter fact is that no political group has a specific plan for transition into a representative democracy or for promotion and protection of human rights. They have taken no step to avert danger of confrontation with society.

The history of Nepal, with its string of failed civilian rulers, does not give much confidence about future political moderation and economic modernisation. In the absence of adequate monitoring mechanisms, not much can be achieved even in a democracy. Indeed, when the power is concentrated among a few, a broad democratic distribution of the benefits or distributive politics is unlikely. It is not hard to see why the ruling elite does not voluntarily initiate democratic transition.

Transition to democracy differs from one country to another. A thorough picture of democratisation cannot be drawn simply by looking at regime elites or interactions between the state and civil society. Again, political choices guarantee that there will be difference of opinion over how to proceed, and where levels of trust are low there is always a danger that the process will be exposed. Whereas there is no finished model of democracy nor is democratic development linear, it may be reversed to a more difficult stage of struggle for democracy. It seems reasonable to assume that the conflict of ‘old’ versus ‘new’ is less central here, yet the opportunity to transform Nepal into a modern democratic state is still not realisable due to the government’s failure to hold the CA election. In fact, the postponement is regarded as a betrayal of democratic process. It has posed a grave danger to the consolidation of nascent democracy, and thus to the survival of the state itself.

It is difficult to determine relative strengths of external factors. Nonetheless,

it is stark opportunism on the part of both PM Koirala, who enjoys near-monopoly of power, and the Maoists who never tire of proclaiming their commitment to participatory democracy but want communist coronation at gun-point. It is also believed that the internal struggle

for power and interests within the ‘greedy factional interests groups’ has led to the rise of self-proclaimed leaders and their authoritarian politics. In fact, a vicious circle is in place, as the state is the most attractive means for accumulation of wealth, power and patronage.

There is no indication that political parties will transform themselves anytime soon. While they remain deeply disoriented, with weak of leadership and organisation, the Maoists particularly happen to be more sophisticated than their counterparts. They were able to draw a large number of people to the streets. It is noteworthy that due to the lack of stable social support, relatively uninformed citizens can make electoral decisions in a way that allows them to be meaningfully represented in the CA. However, Maoist demand for republic through the

interim legislature smacks of fascism, an illegitimate usurpation of power. Without adequately representative and mediating institutions, civil society breaks down and the government loses democratic legitimacy.

As for electoral proportionality, the choices could bring in popular disillusionment, be reduced to empty formalism, and would diminish citizens’ equitable and active participation in politics.

The presidential system is a republican version of limited monarchy. Yet, the pattern of government Nepal now needs

is a republican version of dualistic parliamentary system with the president and the parliament, the cabinet serving a conciliatory organ in between, and where political power rests solely with the people. The keystone of successful conflict prevention in Nepal requires that all relevant players commit themselves to stay on a particular track on all political decisions. It is not necessary for them to make open-ended commitments, but they must have learnt the right lessons. They must have identified the conditions that will permit changes in their level of commitment, if any, and shun politics, personality and party interests to prevent a renewed conflict.

Thapa is professor of Politics, TU