By drawing attention to a supposed Al Qaeda infiltration of the Occupied Territories, Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, may have done Hamas a favour. Despite visceral US and Israeli hostility towards the militant Palestinian movement that won parliamentary elections in the West Bank and Gaza on January 25, Abbas implied that there were far worse alternatives. Al Qaeda is undoubtedly one of them.

Abbas has no reason to love Hamas. The defeat of his Fatah party has left him much weakened. Israel has called him ‘irrelevant’. American efforts are now focused on how best to ostracise a Hamas government when it takes office, unless it first renounces armed struggle and recognises Israel. Abbas has been reduced to the role of spectator. Israel used his comments to propagate its belief that Hamas is party to an international terrorist conspiracy. But the Palestinian president is not alone in trying to place Hamas’ rise to power.

Russia irritated Washington with weekend talks in Moscow with a delegation from Hamas, which it refuses to categorise as a terrorist organisation. Turkey has also defied Israel and the US by hosting a visit from the Palestinians’ new rulers; and some EU countries are wavering over proposed anti-Hamas sanctions. The argument in Ankara and other European capitals is that you cannot promote democracy in the Middle East and then reject its consequences.

Abbas and others say if the Hamas leadership is given time to adjust, it may soften its stance, for example by implementing an indefinite truce. If the US insists on ending international funding for the Palestinian Authority, as Israel is demanding, they say US will only strengthen Palestinian hardliners and rejectionists such as Islamic Jihad, engender ever greater suffering for ordinary Palestinians and risk the final wreck of the peace process. But as matters stand now, that is exactly where US policy is heading.

In its monochrome landscape, the only barrier between Iraqis and a peaceful, democratic future is a minority of armed Sunni insurgents and criminals, backed by foreign jihadis. Iraq’s reality is much more complicated, involving for instance lethal rivalries between Shia militias, inter-regional tensions encouraged by the new US-approved constitution, corrupt or incompetent political, military and police authorities, a still moribund economy, the virtual secession of Kurdistan, and widespread nationalist sentiment opposed to ongoing foreign occupation. But George Bush’s White House, fixated by the fear of all-out civil war in Iraq, facing a collapse of confidence in US policy at home, and beset by record-low presidential approval ratings of 34%, appears less and less able or inclined to pick its way through the Iraqi maze.

In the space of three chaotic years, Bush has gone from talk of a great victory to ill-disguised yearning for a quick, ‘honourable’ exit. In between these two extremes may lie a more pragmatic and effective policy, based on the art of the possible. But like his attitude to Hamas, the president appears to see no middle way.

This black-and-white approach has met with similar reverses elsewhere in the Middle East. Washington’s drive last autumn to unseat Bashar Assad, the Syrian president, following the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister, has ground to a halt. This is partly because US allies in the region, notably Israel, warned of Iraq-style chaos should the Syrian regime collapse. But instead of modifying its stance on Syria in the light of such calculations, and thereby advancing at least some of its objectives, the US appears to have almost lost interest. It remains viscerally hostile to Assad. But seen from Damascus, it has been left looking like a paper tiger. It is easy to point to mistakes. But so predictable and repetitive are the Bush administration’s policy patterns that it is possible, in its case, to identify future accidents waiting to happen. The most troublesome is Iran.

As before the Iraq invasion, Washington is building up a dossier of grievances against Tehran. They range from its nuclear activities and its links with Hamas and Hizbullah to its ‘interference’ in Iraq and its human rights record. And it has succeeded in persuading the American public, according to a recent poll, that Iran’s leadership, like Saddam Hussein before it, is public enemy number one and therefore a direct threat to the US. It appears not to have occurred to Bush that talking directly to Iran on some of the above issues, rather than isolating, antagonising and confronting it with threats of sanctions or force, might actually serve US interests on a wide range of fronts. With the exception of ambassador-level talks with Iran on Iraqi security, such a course of is not contemplated — in part because it might entail compromise. Here once again is the familiar all-or-nothing approach.

Despite all the hard lessons of recent years and greater ‘realism’ in some parts of the foreign policy establishment, Bush is still making pictures in black-and-white. And Iran the movie could soon be coming to a cinema near you. — The Guardian