Undeniably, years of effort has ended the Leviathan state, a vulgarised version of monarchy, which even remained totalitarian epitomising the centralised political and economic management. Nepal has an opportunity to tread the democratic path having twin focal points of economic development and social mobilisation along with civil liberties and pluralism to allow free play for individual interests under the rule of law. However, three hurdles are apparent. Due to the lack of adequate regulating mechanism, conflicts among the organised interests may precipitate violence and disruption of the existing order. Secondly, since democratisation has taken place in phases and in the context of regime collapse, new institutions tend to remain immature and ineffective. And thirdly, there is keen temptation among the new political leaders to cash their populist image at once, even if their position becomes vulnerable.

More conservatively, a pluralistic order comes forth as an offshoot that may contribute to democratisation. In view of the Nepali political history sprinkled with despotic demeanour, it may look politically incorrect to presume that law is a set of objective rules that are applied impartially in a democratic setup and conflicts can be contained to enthuse the society to strive for more democracy. True, some sections of population are found habitually adaptive to democracy.

Yet the problem with Maoists is that they still remain ardent believers in the old central command system in that it seeks monolithic solidarity characterised by self-interest and short-sighted behaviour. It is very difficult for those who believe in the cult of bullet power to seal a deal through other noble means.

Through the ‘people’s power’ movement, we overthrew Gyanendra’s fascist-like regime. Since ours is not a society adulating libertarianism, without a significant

change in Maoists political cultures in levels of social acceptance and popular

resonance that Pridham describes, ‘(if) people believe it to be real, (then) it is real in consequences.’ It is far harder a road than many observers had envisioned.

Exactly how political culture comes about and to what extent it is susceptible to the political machinations that relate to the political system in democratising polities, and economic delivery varies from country to country and depends on specific forces and circumstances.

Essentially, democracy is a public exercise of political power and control. So, it follows that it must have transparency. So, a modern state incessantly strives hard for the rule of law, to scrutinise whether the population of a given community is sufficiently informed and prepared to ensure egalitarianism that accords political rights and opportunities to individuals, and to enable the state become pluralistic and integrative to be able to respond to multi-layered problems. The percolating notion that ours is a case of regime replacement, not transformation, warns us that the situation may be just a ‘quasi democracy’ or it makes a case for the ‘contentious pluralism’ in which agreement over the nature exists, but political pluralism is restricted with no vertical accountability of rulers to the ruled.

Such was the political culture found in Medieval Europe where politics depended explicitly upon personal considerations, connections, promises, favours, and privileges. So, even if free competition is taken as a functional basis for political power, it provides no vertical relationship between the state and the citizen, nor horizontal relationships among the citizens. Clearly, the state is neither the source of all miseries nor an instrument through which one can tackle them. What is even more important, without having precise missions to accomplish, it is not possible to say that the concept of what Mitra termed ‘democratic capital’, that is, modern political institutions, strategic reform of the social and economic structure, and accountability became the central category of political discourse and moved from cognitive mobilisation to creating contribution to democracy.

Nevertheless it is necessary to stress whether the Maoists are sufficiently inclined to adopt a coherent approach toward constitutional culture supportive of substantive goals guided by democratic ideology. Particularly with respect to the question establishing a just and fair society through Maoism, it may be recalled that during both occasions, Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong had institutionally terminated National Planning Commission with its elites purged and personnel sent to the countryside to monopolise resources. It is now widely accepted that the integration of PLA that has a specific ideological content linked to nefarious self-serving activities into NA does not provide an easy answer to the question of what conditions is legitimate, inevitable, and viable, yet ordinances even if constitutional are unethical or illegal acts. But this is not the full story.

Thapa is professor of Politics, TU