Understanding the nature of Nepali state and politics requires a detailed analysis of the socio-political system based on a fuller comprehension of the social structure. Consider the protracted conflict in which both civil contention and state repression are high and violence pervasive. The conflict is not bipolar — it is not a classic civil war. It is being waged between at least three different parties — the feudal monarchy, the Maoists, and the anti-authoritarian political groups — separating those who are bent upon finding a reformist and negotiated solution to the conflict from those who conjure up a solution on military terms.

A situation has emerged wherein governance is contested, state laws receive little compliance and institutions lack legitimacy. It is rapidly becoming a fractured society with weak and often no connections to the body politic.

Nepali politics is deficient in two key aspects. One problem is the monarchy, which is clientelist, rent-seeking and self-serving. Despite the King’s claim of having beaten the Maoist rebellion to a few sporadic criminal activities, the situation has turned dangerous and chaos has spiralled widely into daily gun battles. Not only have the King’s attempts to win the hearts of the people with promises to end corruption and vows to crush the rebellion failed, the rebels now control much of the rural landscape and virtually run a mini-state. He has failed miserably to convince the Nepali people or international community that there is a military solution to the political problem of Nepal.

There is no choice between regression to autocracy and progression to democracy. Yet sultanistic regimes with no opposition in public domain are vulnerable to two kinds of threat. One is the death of the leader and the instability that might follow. And the other is the Indonesian type of unpredictable violence by a desperate population that comes when the combination of economic decline and political repression becomes intolerable.

Also consider that the King might not have planned to reintroduce despotic rule, but it can hardly be denied that he gives an impression that he intends to change the balance of power in favour of centralisation and wide discretionary powers for himself. His response has been to rely on domination by intensifying militarisation. Whereas public opinion strongly supports an end to the violence through negotiations with the Maoists, the King wants to rule with an iron grip without any regard to democratisation which involves distribution of power and institutionalisation of pluralistic practices.

On the other hand, though Maoists are influenced by Marxism, their psyche is governed by Bolshevic activism. They continue to believe that an armed revolution can change everything. True, one can break the door with sledgehammers and spears, but democracy and justice cannot be established through violence. The blame may also be put on the anti-authoritarian class that has either become pariah among the population or are ineffective figureheads or both. In minimal sense, the catch-all tendency of pro-democracy groups during the protracted transition to democracy has provided for the emergence of unorganised and a relatively unstable party system.

Subjectively, we do not understand why Americans are reluctant to realise the importance of the Maoists-seven parties accord. But, one has to be realistic that neither the insurgency nor the anti-authoritarian movement has emerged merely because of a few people’s personal grudges. In a sense, if the King acts in ways that Nepalis see him as hostile to their interests, Nepali politics will produce outcomes that are hostile to his interests.

Although the immediate causes of Nepal’s conflict are largely economic, on a more fundamental level, the origin is the failure of effective interest in mediation. The use of sanctions to change the behaviour of delinquent states or wayward democracies is both sensible and necessary. But, applying economic sanctions against Nepal will have no remedial effect on its tyrannical regime, which has no compunction in clinging to power while the long-suffering population is likely to have perverse effects.

A new series of institutions and legal provisions is required to be introduced in place of the prevailing ones; a partial list of which would include: a complete revamping of the Constitution to enhance constitutional rule, enacting electoral laws for multiparty and proportional representation, discarding the official symbols and terms, especially the national anthem, setting up new institutions with the rules of the game to inculcate the values of a multiparty federal republic system, and strengthening the independence of judiciary. Democracy does provide instruments to solve the problems of dictatorship and autocratic rule, and to a certain point, the problem of oppression; it does not necessarily mean that it has the solution to every problem.

Thapa is professor of Politics, TU