Fighting guerrillas and terrorists is more akin to fighting crime than wars. Where wars have a beginning and an end, guerrilla conflicts and terrorism are often ongoing problems that, like crime, need to be contained because it is unlikely that they can ever be eradicated. It should not be surprising then that with its 1982 war in Lebanon, as well as the two Palestinian uprisings (1987 and 2000), Israel has been unable to achieve a clear-cut victory. But this does not mean that Israel did not ultimately win those conflicts, only that the definition of victory has to be recalibrated to account for the current realities of armed conflict. The most useful way to gauge success in today’s complex battlefield is probably to look at the initial interests that each party to the conflict had at the outset, and then look at the outcome to see what each party was able to achieve.

First, there’s Hizbullah. The guerrilla organisation had been in control of most of southern Lebanon since the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000. They also were able to play a role beyond Lebanon’s borders by heavily supporting Palestinian terrorist attacks via the Islamic Jihad and Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade organisations. Their probable goal in kidnapping two Israeli soldiers in July was to cause Israel to release Lebanese and Palestinian terrorists being held in its prisons, thereby boosting Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s significance in the region. But because of the subsequent Israeli response, Hizbullah wasn’t able to achieve its aim.

Israel has severely battered Hizbullah’s military infrastructure, though certainly not put it out of commission. Nevertheless, the organisation has lost a significant number of personnel and medium-range rockets. The organisation has also lost, assuming that the present UN ceasefire plan is implemented as promised, its forward deployment positions along Israel’s border and, indeed, exclusive control over territory south of the Litani River.

Most important, in the coming months, Hizbullah will discover that it has alienated most of the Lebanese population, including large numbers of Lebanese Shiites, because its aggressive actions produced a harsh Israeli response that has brought the destruction of significant areas and infrastructure in Lebanon, as well as a major loss of human life. Ultimately, Hizbullah will come out of this conflict considerably weakened as compared to its earlier position.

Israel had a clear interest in removing Hizbullah’s presence from its border and most of southern Lebanon. Israel wanted to deprive Hizbullah of its capacity to wreak havoc on Israel by depriving it of its more powerful medium-range rocket arsenal.

Israel wanted to weaken Hizbullah’s political standing in Lebanon by turning Lebanese public opinion against Nasrallah’s organisation. Finally, Israel wanted to delegitimise Hizbullah in the region and beyond by emphasising its ties with Iran.

On balance, Israel achieved the bulk of its goals while Hizbullah can point to few accomplishments. — The Christian Science Monitor