Himalayan News Service

New Delhi, April 2:

Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf was invited for the Agra 2001 summit against the advice of the foreign ministry, says a new book by the late National Security Advisor JN Dixit.

And the country’s political leadership also did not accept the advice not to extend unflinching support to the US in its war on terrorism unless US acted tough against Pakistan.

The book, Indian Foreign Service — History and Challenge, says Musharraf was invited to India by the government “despite clear advice given against such a visit by senior members of the Indian Foreign Service in the ministry of external affairs as well as by the National Security Advisory Board of the government of India”.

Dixit went on to say: “There is a story that the ministry’s advice was ignored by then (External Affairs) Minister Jaswant Singh because he was persuaded by arguments of the US government to hold such a summit meeting. This is the view expressed to the author by his colleagues who were in the service at that point of time, (and) some of them are still in service.” Prime Minister Manmohan Singh released Dixit’s last book this week. Dixit had completed the book (published by Konark) that chronicles the evolution of India’s prestigious diplomatic service weeks before he died of a heart attack on January 3. Dixit stated that the Agra summit “ended in a fiasco primarily because the government of India did not have a structured agenda or any clear idea of what was hoped to be achieved at this summit”.

Similarly, the book says, that the Atal Behari Vajpayee government ignored the advice of foreign service establishment over giving unconditional support to the US in its war on terrorism.

Dixit gives several instances when it says the top leaders of the day overruled counsel from foreign ministry officials and went ahead with decisions that have come to haunt or adversely affect the country.

These included Jawaharlal Nehru’s decision to approach the UN on the Kashmir issue and his trust of the Chinese who ended up launching a war against India in 1962.

“A section of the middle level officers of the foreign service were against India going to the UN on the Kashmir issue in 1947-48,” he wrote.

“This group of officers felt that once the Instrument of Accession was signed by Maharaja Hari Singh, India had the locus standi to complete its military operations against Pakistan-sponsored tribal infiltrators and the Pakistani troops... “For whatever reasons Nehru disagreed with them and chose the alternative option of going to the UN.” Similarly the book reveals that even on relations with China, Nehru was advised in the early 60s by then foreign office secretary general, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, “about being over-optimistic about Sino-Indian relations.