Opinion

Nepal's floods must become policy, not pathos: It must turn climate vulnerability into climate diplomacy

The world cannot reverse the emissions already accumulated in the atmosphere. But it can decide who carries the costs of adapting to their consequences

By Binoj Basnyat

Betrawati Bazaar, which was turned into a sandbar by the flood that came into the Trishuli River via the Bhote Koshi of Rasuwa. Before the flood came on the 10th of Bhadra, this place, which now appears as a sandbar after being damaged by the Trishuli River, was a dense settlement covered with houses and structures, including a school. Photo: Ramhari Neupane/RSS.

Climate change presents Nepal with a paradox. The country contributes approximately 0.027% of global greenhouse-gas emissions, yet it is increasingly exposed to their consequences. Melting glaciers, glacial lake outburst floods, erratic rainfall, landslides, floods, and changing agricultural conditions are no longer distant environmental concerns. They are becoming questions of development, national resilience, and, increasingly, national security. Greta Thunberg has once again reminded the world of a truth too often ignored: justice does not wait for the powerful to feel guilty-it demands that they act. Her solidarity with Nepal is not charity. It is recognition of a debt long overdue. Nepal therefore has every reason to demand climate justice. But how it makes that argument matters. The US, despite representing about 4% of the world's population, contributed roughly 17% of global warming between 1850 and 2021, compared with about 12% for China and 5% for India, each representing about 18% of the global population. Yet China alone accounted for roughly 30% of global greenhouse-gas emissions in 2021. These differences show why the proposition that China, India, and the US should simply 'pay Nepal' is politically attractive but strategically incomplete: historical responsibility, current emissions, capacity, and vulnerability must all be considered. Climate change is cumulative. The warming we experience today is substantially connected to emissions accumulated over decades of industrialisation. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that developed countries accounted for approximately 57 percent of cumulative fossil-fuel and industrial CO₂ emissions between 1850 and 2019, while least-developed countries contributed only about 0.4 percent. That imbalance provides a legitimate foundation for Nepal's claim. The principle is not new. Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities, or CBDR-RC, embedded in the Paris Agreement, recognises that all countries share responsibility for addressing climate change, but they do not have identical responsibilities or capacities. Nepal's case should be nuanced: historical emissions matter, current major emitters must act faster, and countries with greater capacity must provide finance, technology, and loss-and-damage support. At the same time, Nepal must demonstrate its own responsibility by investing in resilience and reducing avoidable vulnerabilities. This distinction is crucial. This is why Nepal should be cautious about reducing its climate diplomacy to the phrase 'polluter pays.' The language of reparations can create unnecessary legal and political disputes. Nepal's more persuasive demand is for a fair international system of adaptation finance, loss-and-damage support, technology transfer, capacity building and climate-resilient investment. Minister for Foreign Affairs Shisir Khanal says Nepal's call has been for the global community to view disasters through the lens of climate change and its impact on Nepal. Nepal has not claimed or asked for compensation; rather, China, India, and Nepal should work together to face similar challenges. Nepal should therefore make its case not as a demand for charity but as a demand for equity. There is also a strategic risk in portraying Nepal solely as a victim. Credible climate diplomacy requires Nepal to demonstrate that it is prepared to shoulder its own responsibilities. The challenge now is to transform climate vulnerability into strategic diplomatic leverage. Nepal sits at the centre of the Himalayas, one of the world's most environmentally sensitive regions. Glacial melt, river systems, floods, biodiversity loss, food insecurity, and water stress have implications across the Himalayan region and beyond. That creates an opportunity for Nepal to move from being primarily a recipient of climate assistance to becoming an advocate for regional climate cooperation. The larger objective should be a permanent National Resilience Architecture connecting climate science, disaster management, infrastructure, water security, agriculture, diplomacy and national security. Climate change is therefore not simply an environmental issue for Nepal. It is a test of state capacity. The world cannot reverse the emissions already accumulated in the atmosphere. But it can decide who carries the costs of adapting to their consequences. For Nepal, the diplomatic task is to ensure that those costs are distributed according to responsibility, capability, and vulnerability. Resilience needs to be framed with diplomacy. Prime Minister Balen Shah should use both UNGA81 and COP31 to strengthen Nepal's foreign policy as a champion of small and vulnerable nations, placing climate justice firmly within the framework of international law. Nepal's floods must become policy, not pathos. At UNGA81, Kathmandu should advocate a dedicated loss-and-damage window for mountain states; through BIMSTEC, it should advance a Himalaya-Bay of Bengal Resilience Framework; and Nepal, India, and China should establish a narrow, practical trilateral resilience mechanism focused on early warning, hydrological data, glacier monitoring, and disaster response. At home, Nepal must move from ad-hoc disaster response to permanent resilience. A standing Glacial and Disaster Authority should integrate early warning, resilient infrastructure, land-use planning, watershed protection, agriculture, and glacial and hydrological monitoring to build a state capable of anticipating cascading risks, not merely responding to disasters after they strike. Diplomatically, Nepal can use its position as a frontline Himalayan state to build coalitions of mountain and small states, beginning with Bhutan and extending to Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, to elevate climate-security concerns in international forums and give its voice influence disproportionate to its size, much as small island states have shaped global climate negotiations. The message should be straightforward: Nepal did not create the climate crisis, but Nepal will not use that fact as an excuse for inaction. This gives Nepal greater moral authority when asking others to do more. Basnyat is Maj. General (retd), Nepali Army