Conventional analysis of Nepal's relations with emerging multilateral forums treats non-participation in BRICS as a shortcoming-evidence of Nepal's marginal status, exclusion by powerful states, or failure to enter a growing and influential international organization. This analysis is strategically mistaken. Nepal's exclusion from BRICS, whether deliberate or circumstantial, is not a liability but a strategic asset. This distinction is essential for determining Nepal's long-term national position and for understanding the geopolitical significance that has eluded international analysis. The fundamental error of conventional thinking is the assumption that all multilateral forums are equally desirable for all nations at all times. BRICS membership carries both benefits and substantial strategic costs-costs that Nepal successfully avoids through non-participation. At the same time, non-participation creates strategic space for Nepal to develop alternative partnerships that can serve Nepali interests in ways BRICS membership never could. The strategic value of this position has not been adequately recognized by Nepal's own policymakers, by regional powers, or by international observers. Understanding this value is essential for both Nepal's strategic autonomy and for the United States' capacity to develop effective policy toward the Himalayan region. THE STRATEGIC COST OF BLOC MEMBERSHIP: ANALYZING BRICS CONSTRAINTS Despite its economic weight and institutional development, BRICS increasingly functions as a geopolitical bloc within a broader great-power competition. Member states face pressure to align their positions on international disputes, coordinate voting in international organizations, and present a united front on issues affecting bloc interests. This bloc discipline generates collective power while also constraining the operational autonomy of individual members. For a nation like Nepal-small, economically vulnerable, and geographically caught between competing powers-this constraint represents an existential strategic threat. Consider India's position within BRICS. New Delhi must balance participation in BRICS forums-where it coordinates with Russia, China, Brazil, and South Africa on development banking, trade arrangements, and geopolitical positioning-with participation in the Quad, where it coordinates with the United States, Japan, and Australia on Indo-Pacific security. This dual position creates inherent tension, sometimes approaching structural contradiction. India cannot fully meet BRICS expectations of coordination against Western interests while simultaneously deepening Quad engagement on Indo-Pacific security issues where the United States and India share strategic concerns. India's size, economic resources, and diplomatic sophistication allow New Delhi to manage this tension, though at significant cost. The costs are evident in India's constrained public statements on China, its cautious approach to BRICS coordination, and the diplomatic labor required to maintain both relationships simultaneously. For a small, less-developed nation more sensitive to great-power pressure such as Nepal, BRICS membership would create similar constraints with far less compensatory benefit. Nepal would face systematic pressure to align its positions on international disputes with BRICS consensus, participate in BRICS-led economic initiatives that may not serve Nepali interests, coordinate foreign-policy positions with Russia, China, and India in ways that limit Nepali strategic flexibility, and accept an institutional hierarchy within BRICS in which Nepal's voice would remain marginal compared with that of larger members. Nepal would sacrifice strategic autonomy in exchange for minimal economic benefit and marginal institutional influence-a catastrophic trade for a nation dependent on maintaining multiple strategic relationships. Non-participation, by contrast, allows Nepal to cooperate with BRICS members on specific initiatives-infrastructure development with China, security coordination with India, development partnerships with Russia-while retaining full strategic autonomy on issues where BRICS positions diverge from Nepali interests. This flexibility is not merely advantageous; for a nation of Nepal's size and position, it is strategically essential. THE CHINA-INDIA FRACTURE: INSTITUTIONAL INSTABILITY WITHIN BRICS BRICS is increasingly fracturing along the China-India axis in ways that have escaped sufficient strategic analysis. The 2020 Galwan Valley clash-in which Chinese and Indian military forces engaged in direct combat resulting in twenty Indian Army soldiers killed-and the subsequent Chinese military buildup along the Line of Actual Control have created fundamental strategic tension within BRICS. This is not a temporary disagreement amenable to diplomatic resolution. India views Chinese military expansion in the Himalayas as a direct, existential threat to Indian security and territorial integrity. China views Indian engagement with the Quad as an attempt at strategic encirclement designed to constrain Chinese power projection in Asia. Although formally bound within BRICS institutional structures, China and India pursue fundamentally contradictory strategic objectives in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. The contradiction is not incidental; it reflects irreconcilable differences in their regional ambitions. China seeks to establish a sphere of influence extending from Tibet through South Asia to the Indian Ocean. India seeks to maintain regional primacy in South Asia while developing strategic partnerships with distant powers to counterbalance Chinese power. These objectives cannot be simultaneously achieved. This fracture places every BRICS member in an uncomfortable position, creating impossible diplomatic situations in which members must either take sides in the China-India dispute or maintain public neutrality while private conversations reveal their true alignments. Had Nepal been a BRICS member, the country would have been forced to navigate the China-India dispute from within an institutional framework designed to present unity. This would have been diplomatically unstable, creating impossible constraints on Nepal's foreign policy. Nepal would have been pressured by China to support Chinese positions while simultaneously pressured by India-Nepal's immediate neighbor and security guarantor-to support Indian positions. As a nation that must maintain partnerships with both China and India for security, development, and survival, Nepal cannot afford the appearance of taking sides in the China-India dispute inside an institutional forum. The diplomatic, security, and economic costs of such a choice would be catastrophic. Non-participation in BRICS avoids this constraint entirely. Nepal maintains the capacity to cooperate with China on infrastructure and development issues, continue deep security partnerships with India including Gurkha recruitment and security guarantees, and simultaneously pursue independent strategic partnerships with other powers without accusations of BRICS betrayal or the need to justify its position inside BRICS institutional structures. In an era of intensifying great-power competition and regional fracture, this flexibility is the most valuable asset Nepal can possess. PROTECTION FROM ECONOMIC COERCION: THE US TARIFF PRECEDENT The Trump administration's rising tariffs on Indian goods-ostensibly targeted at Chinese economic pressure but striking partner nations with equal force-demonstrate a critical strategic reality: BRICS membership provides no protection against economic pressure from the United States. This precedent carries crucial implications for Nepal's strategic calculations. India, a founding BRICS member that plays a leadership role within the forum and claims to speak on behalf of the developing world, has been unable to escape American protectionism. Despite India's status as a strategic partner in the Quad, despite India's role as the de facto leader of BRICS development initiatives, and despite India's efforts to mediate between BRICS interests and Western economic interests, India's large economy has been targeted for tariffs that reflect American strategic interests unilaterally determined. U.S. trade policy does not reflect BRICS membership status, the quality of relations with India, or the institutional arrangements binding BRICS members. American trade policy reflects American strategic interests, determined through American political processes, and applied with little regard for the multilateral arrangements or diplomatic relationships of affected nations. This precedent is profoundly important for Nepal. Had Nepal been a BRICS member, participation in Chinese-led economic initiatives combined with BRICS coordination against Western economic interests could have invited American economic pressure or targeted sanctions. Nepal's small economy cannot absorb American tariffs or sanctions the way India's large economy can. The economic damage from American economic coercion could undermine Nepal's development, disrupt critical infrastructure investments, and create conditions for political instability. Non-participation in BRICS protects Nepal from this risk. Nepal can maintain normal economic relations with all BRICS members while avoiding the perception that it is aligned with BRICS-led alternatives to Western economic architecture. For a nation of Nepal's economic scale and vulnerability, this position is strategically advantageous. AMERICAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN NEPAL: INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY, AND REGIONAL BALANCE The United States has substantial strategic interests in the Himalayan region that current diplomatic and military posture does not adequately serve. However, American understanding of Nepal's geopolitical significance remains limited, and American intelligence capability in the region remains constrained. This gap between strategic interest and operational capacity must be addressed through a systematic engagement strategy centered on Nepal as a geographic and intelligence platform. First, Tibet remains one of the world's least transparent and most strategically significant military theaters. Chinese military deployments, infrastructure development, and strategic positioning in Tibet have intensified dramatically in recent years. New roads, military bases, surveillance systems, and deployment of advanced weapons systems have transformed Tibet into a forward strategic position from which China can project power across South Asia and into the Indian Ocean. Yet American intelligence-collection capacity in the region remains limited. Satellite imagery provides only partial coverage. Signals intelligence collection is constrained by geographic distance and Chinese security measures. Human intelligence networks are sparse. Nepal, directly connected to Tibet through multiple border regions and with cultural, economic, and linguistic connections to Tibetan communities, offers geographic access for intelligence-collection platforms that would multiply American strategic effectiveness. An American intelligence presence in Nepal-properly calibrated to respect Nepali sovereignty and avoid perceptions of interference-could substantially improve American understanding of Chinese military strategy, weapons deployments, and force posture in one of the world's most strategically significant regions. Second, transnational extremist organizations present a direct terrorism threat that requires urgent attention. Pakistan-based extremist organizations operate in the Himalayan region, including in Kashmir and along the Nepal-India border. These organizations conduct recruitment in Nepal, utilize Nepal as a transit route for personnel and weapons, and conduct planning for operations across the region. Coordinated intelligence exchange between Nepal and the United States could improve both countries' counterterrorism capabilities and regional security management. The capacity to track extremist movements, identify operational planning, and disrupt terrorist networks before attacks occur depends on intelligence sharing among nations positioned to observe extremist activity. Nepal's position, its access to border regions, and its capacity to monitor extremist movements make Nepali intelligence cooperation essential for American counterterrorism effectiveness in South Asia. Third, Himalayan water systems affect the security and stability of more than 1.5 billion people across South Asia. The Himalayan glaciers supply water to the Ganges, Brahmaputra, Indus, and Mekong rivers-systems that sustain the populations of India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, China, and Southeast Asia. Climate change is transforming these water systems in ways that present direct security threats: glacier retreat, altered precipitation patterns, increased flooding and landslide risk, and transnational water disputes. Nepal, situated in the heart of the Himalayan water system, is simultaneously most vulnerable to these changes and most capable of contributing to regional water security monitoring and management. American engagement in Nepal on water security, climate adaptation, and disaster response serves legitimate strategic interests while advancing development objectives. This engagement also positions the United States to understand climate-security dynamics that will shape regional stability for decades. Fourth, Belt and Road Initiative investment has presented China as Nepal's principal infrastructure investor and strategic partner. Yet Chinese investment has generated substantial discontent over sovereignty erosion, environmental degradation, debt sustainability, and economic dominance. American engagement in Nepal would provide a balance to a monopolistic Chinese position, offering alternative infrastructure investment, development assistance, and partnership models that respect Nepali sovereignty. This is not a zero-sum competition for influence; rather, it is ensuring that Nepal has meaningful choices in its partnerships, that Chinese economic leverage does not translate into political dominance, and that Nepal's development trajectory is shaped by Nepali strategic choices rather than external coercion. AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS IN NEPAL: BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY American intelligence agencies have not adequately resourced their understanding of Nepal's geopolitical significance or developed the institutional capacity necessary to operate effectively in the region. This gap must be addressed immediately. Nepal represents a critical geographic window into Chinese military activity, extremist networks, regional security dynamics, and transnational threats. Yet American intelligence presence in Nepal remains sparse, American analytical capacity on Nepal-specific issues is limited, and American language and cultural expertise on Nepal is underdeveloped. The Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence organizations should establish dedicated Nepal accounts with personnel who possess fluent Nepali language capability, deep knowledge of Nepali political dynamics, understanding of the specific security threats Nepal faces, and capacity to develop sources among Nepali security officials and military leadership. Intelligence officers should be trained in Himalayan geography, geopolitics, and regional security dynamics. Language training in Nepali should be prioritized. Cultural training should emphasize the specific historical, political, and security context of Nepal. Intelligence analysis on Nepal should be elevated in importance and resourced accordingly. The Defense Intelligence Agency should establish dedicated military intelligence relationships with the Nepali Army, developing shared understanding of regional security threats, Chinese military activity, and extremist networks. Military intelligence liaison officers should work within Nepali military institutions to facilitate intelligence exchange and develop mutual understanding of operational priorities. Joint intelligence analysis of Himalayan security dynamics should be conducted, with focus on Chinese military deployments, extremist activity, and border security challenges. This institutional relationship should be formalized and continuous, not ad hoc or episodic. The National Security Agency should develop signals intelligence collection capacity targeting the Nepal-Tibet border region and Himalayan communication networks. Signals intelligence collection focused on Chinese military communications, weapons systems testing, and military-to-civilian coordination would provide critical insights into Chinese strategic activity. This collection should be coordinated with human intelligence collection to provide comprehensive understanding of Chinese operations in Tibet and the Himalayan region. The State Department should significantly expand its intelligence support operations in Nepal, developing the capacity to understand Nepali political dynamics, track extremist activity, monitor Chinese economic and political influence, and support American diplomatic objectives. The existing intelligence presence is insufficient for the strategic significance of the relationship. Nepal should be treated as a priority country for American intelligence resources, not a secondary consideration. NEPAL'S UNIQUE ADVANTAGES FOR AMERICAN STRATEGIC POSITIONING Among South Asian nations, Nepal offers unique advantages for American strategic positioning that are unmatched in the region. These advantages are not incidental; they flow from Nepal's specific geographic location, political system, historical trajectory, and current strategic position. First, Nepal is a functioning democracy with regular elections, constitutional protections, and institutional mechanisms of political competition. While Nepali democracy is imperfect and faces challenges, it provides legitimacy for American partnership that might be questioned in more authoritarian contexts. The United States can engage with Nepal as a democratic partner, supporting democratic institutions and human rights, without the political complications that arise from partnerships with authoritarian states. This democratic legitimacy is crucial for domestic support within Nepal for American engagement and for international credibility of American strategy. Second, Nepal's location is geographically unique. Nepal is directly connected to Tibet, positioned at the intersection of Indian and Chinese security interests, and serves as a gateway to the Himalayan region. No other South Asian nation provides this combination of geographic access. Nepal's location creates opportunities for intelligence collection, strategic positioning, and regional influence that are unavailable elsewhere in South Asia. This geographic position is a strategic asset of the highest order. Third, unlike nations whose relations with the United States are rooted in Cold War engagements or colonial relationships, Nepal carries no historical burden that complicates American involvement. Partnership with Nepal can be framed as strategic cooperation between sovereign nations, not as a legacy colonial relationship or Cold War alliance imposed by external forces. This creates a foundation for a partnership based on mutual interest and mutual respect, rather than on historical obligations or power imbalances rooted in the colonial era. For Nepali domestic politics and for regional perceptions of American intentions, this is strategically important. Fourth, Nepal's existing arrangements to supply specialized soldiers to several Western powers-including the United Kingdom, Singapore, and other nations-already create an institutional basis and military-cooperation foundation. The Gurkha tradition represents more than a century of military professionalism, demonstrated capability, and institutional relationship. American defense partnerships with Nepal can build on this existing foundation, utilizing existing military relationships and trust to develop deeper strategic cooperation. The political obstacles to American military engagement with Nepal are substantially lower than with most other Asian nations. Fifth, China's hard approach toward Nepal-seeking a monopolistic position through infrastructure investment while paying insufficient attention to Nepali sovereignty concerns-has created an opening for alternative partners. Nepal has experienced Chinese pressure, unfulfilled promises, and infrastructure projects that have generated domestic criticism. This creates demand within Nepal for alternative partnerships and strategic relationships. The United States can offer partnership without the dominance that characterizes Chinese engagement, positioning itself as a partner that respects Nepali sovereignty while providing genuine development assistance and strategic cooperation. COMPREHENSIVE PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK: STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURE Rather than treating American engagement in Nepal as ad hoc or opportunistic, a long-term strategic partnership requires a comprehensive agenda covering defense cooperation, intelligence exchange, technology transfer, development assistance, and political support. This agenda should be formalized through treaty arrangements and institutional mechanisms that bind the two nations across multiple dimensions. The framework must clearly present American engagement as supporting Nepal's sovereignty, independence, and development-not as placing Nepal inside an anti-China encirclement strategy or forcing Nepal to choose between China and the United States. This comprehensive approach is strategically correct because American interests in Nepal are served by a stable, developed, non-aligned Nepal that maintains capacity to work with multiple partners. It is politically necessary because domestic Nepali support for partnership requires assurance that the partnership strengthens rather than weakens Nepali independence. American policy must make explicit that this partnership is designed to enhance Nepal's strategic autonomy, not to constrain it. The strategic partnership should encompass five dimensions: (1) Defense and Military Cooperation; (2) Intelligence Exchange and Counterterrorism; (3) Development Assistance and Infrastructure Investment; (4) Technology Transfer and Capacity Building; and (5) Institutional and Diplomatic Support. Each dimension should be developed systematically, with clear objectives, dedicated resources, and long-term commitment. PHASE ONE: INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE AND SECURITY COOPERATION The initial phase of the partnership should establish regular intelligence exchange and develop a shared understanding of regional security threats. This phase is foundational; all subsequent cooperation builds on the intelligence relationship established during this phase. Permanent American intelligence liaison offices should be established within Nepali military and security institutions, operating alongside existing liaison arrangements with Indian intelligence services. These offices would focus on multiple operational priorities: counterterrorism intelligence exchange concerning Pakistani extremist organizations; monitoring of Chinese military activity in Tibet shared with Nepal's military leadership; intelligence on transnational crime, human trafficking, and drug smuggling; and coordination on border security and cross-border security challenges. These liaison offices should be staffed by intelligence professionals with deep regional expertise, Nepali language capability, and experience in South Asian security dynamics. Bilateral working groups should be established to identify, track, and disrupt terrorist organizations operating in the Himalayan region. Working groups should include Nepali military personnel, American military and intelligence officers, and representatives of security agencies. These groups should conduct joint threat assessments, coordinate surveillance and intelligence collection, identify operatives before attacks occur, and disrupt funding and supply networks. Regular meetings should be held to share intelligence, discuss emerging threats, and coordinate operations. Military intelligence-exchange mechanisms should be formalized so that the American and Nepali militaries share assessments of regional security dynamics, Chinese military posture, Pakistani extremist activity, and transnational security challenges. Joint intelligence analysis should be conducted on issues of mutual concern. Intelligence assessments should be shared with appropriate security clearances. Nepal should be provided secure communications systems that allow real-time intelligence exchange between Nepali security agencies and their American counterparts. A permanent American military liaison office should be established within the Nepali Army headquarters. This office would facilitate military-to-military communication, coordinate defense cooperation activities, provide military intelligence to Nepali military leadership, and develop personal relationships between American and Nepali military officers. This liaison office should be staffed by senior military officers with rank and authority sufficient to engage effectively with Nepali military leadership. STRATEGIC CONCLUSION: NEPAL AS A PLATFORM FOR AMERICAN STRATEGIC SUCCESS Nepal's strategic non-participation in BRICS is not a marginal fact of international relations. It is a critical asset that should be leveraged by both Nepal and the United States to advance shared strategic interests. For Nepal, non-participation preserves strategic autonomy, protects against great-power coercion, and creates space for partnerships that serve Nepali development and security. For the United States, Nepal represents a geographic platform for intelligence collection, counterterrorism cooperation, and strategic positioning in a region of critical importance. A comprehensive, long-term American partnership with Nepal serves American strategic interests while supporting Nepal's independence and development. This partnership should be formalized, institutionalized, and resourced at levels commensurate with Nepal's strategic significance. American intelligence agencies must develop the capacity to understand Nepal's geopolitical position in depth, establish permanent presence in Nepal, and build relationships with Nepali security officials. American defense establishment should establish comprehensive military cooperation. American development agencies should prioritize Nepal as a development partner and as a platform for advancing American strategic interests. The strategic window for developing this partnership is open. Nepal is interested in alternative partnerships. China's dominance is generating dissatisfaction. American strategic attention to Nepal, combined with genuine development assistance and respectful engagement, can position the United States as a valuable partner supporting Nepali sovereignty and development. This is not a zero-sum competition with China, nor is it an attempt to force Nepal to choose sides. Rather, it is ensuring that Nepal has genuine choices, that Nepali strategic autonomy is respected, and that American interests in regional stability and security are advanced. The time to develop this strategic partnership is now. Bajgain is a former member of the House of Representatives, Nepal