Daura suruwal diplomacy: Why Shah and Modi must guard the Himalayan grid
Published: 11:02 am Nov 19, 2026
Nepal's rivers are its greatest strategic asset, and the way we develop them will decide whether we remain a dependent economy or become South Asia's clean-energy hub. Energy security is now national security. As Prime Minister Balendra Shah prepares for his first state visit to India, from 22 November, hydropower must sit at the centre of Nepal's agenda, and it must be negotiated from strength, not from need. Energy security is national security Nepal is no longer only a country that imports power in winter and spills water in summer. In fiscal year 2082/83, our electricity exports rose by almost 63 percent, to 3.88 billion units, and earned NPR 29.32 billion from India and Bangladesh. Even after the devastating Bhotekoshi floods of 26 August, the Nepal Electricity Authority earned NPR 5.93 billion in a single month from sales to India. Through a three-way agreement with India and Bangladesh, we now also sell 40 megawatts to Dhaka at 6.40 US cents a unit, our first dollar earnings from electricity. These are real achievements. They are also a warning. The 26 August floods damaged twelve hydropower projects, and at the height of the monsoon Nepal could not export 73.75 MW from three projects because their export approvals had not been renewed in New Delhi. Bangladesh wants another 20 MW, at the same price, but the expansion has stalled for want of Indian transit approval. A country whose income depends on a single transmission route, a single buyer's permission and rivers that floods can shut down in a night has not yet achieved energy security. The government's own Energy Development Roadmap aims for 28,500 MW of generation by 2035 and 15,000 MW of exports. Nepal's technical potential is far larger. But targets on paper mean little if projects take two decades, if contracts become sources of rent, and if the grid that carries our power is not protected. We must stop thinking of ourselves as a seller of a commodity and start thinking as a market maker: a country that trades power with many partners, on our terms, through infrastructure we control. Three lessons Nepal cannot ignore The grid is a front line In June 2020, Indian and Chinese troops clashed in the Galwan Valley. Four months later, on 12 October, a blackout stopped Mumbai's trains, hospitals and stock exchange for hours. In 2021 the American security firm Recorded Future reported that a Chinese state-linked group it called RedEcho had targeted ten Indian power-sector organisations and two seaports, and The New York Times raised the question of a link to the blackout. Maharashtra's energy minister accepted the claim, while India's Union power minister said there was no evidence a cyberattack caused the outage. Whatever the final truth about Mumbai, the lesson is beyond dispute. In a crisis between great powers, electricity grids, control rooms and transmission software become targets. Nepal sits between the two largest powers in Asia, and our grid is now physically joined to India's and, through India, to Bangladesh's. Every turbine controller, SCADA system, substation and fibre link we install is part of our national security. Energy security cannot be separated from national security. Sunkoshi–Marin: delay, cancellation and unanswered questions The Sunkoshi–Marin Diversion Multipurpose Project is meant to carry Sunkoshi water through a 13.1-kilometre tunnel to the Marin River, generate 31 MW and irrigate about 122,000 hectares of Madhesh farmland. Instead it has become a case study in how national pride projects fail. The first dam contractor reached only 11 percent progress after 60 percent of the contract period had passed. Its contract was terminated, Rs 3.6 billion in guarantees forfeited, and the firm blacklisted. Now the replacement tender has also been cancelled, with the government citing legal and procedural irregularities. Senior lawyers and procurement experts have questioned the legal basis of the cancellation and warned that it could unsettle donors such as the World Bank and ADB. Questions are also being asked about who stands behind the joint ventures bidding for this work, including the Nepali partners and their political and financial connections. I do not ask anyone to accept rumours. I ask for light. The ownership of every bidding joint venture, the reasons for each cancellation and any links between bidders and political leaders should be disclosed and independently examined. If the cancellation was right, transparency will prove it. If it was wrong, transparency will correct it. Either way, the farmers of Madhesh have waited long enough. Upper Tamakoshi: when delay becomes a business model Upper Tamakoshi, our 456 MW national pride project built by Nepali investors, should have been finished in six years. It took a decade. Its estimated cost rose from about US$409 million to around US$709 million. The earthquake, the 2015 blockade and Covid all played a part. So did a redesigned tunnel and a hydro-mechanical contractor so slow that part of its work had to be handed to another firm. At one point a prime minister said the country was losing Rs 130 million a day from the delay. Government officials themselves have blamed cost overruns on low bidding and collusion between contractors and consultants. Prolonged construction, repeated cost escalations and contractual disputes create space for rent-seeking. Every variation order and extension becomes a negotiation, and every negotiation becomes an opportunity. Project delays must never again become a business model for contractors, intermediaries or political beneficiaries. A new approach: five pillars for hydropower investment Nepal needs a new approach, built on competition, transparency and security. The aim is not to choose one geopolitical camp. It is to make global investors compete for the right to build in Nepal, and to make that competition work for the Nepali people. 1. Competitive international investment. Nepal should actively invite Tata, Jindal, Adani, Reliance and other credible Indian energy groups to develop hydropower here. Indian investors understand the Indian market, can bring Indian buyers with them, and have every reason to keep transmission routes open for power they themselves produce. Their participation turns India from a gatekeeper into a stakeholder. 2. Democratic investment partners. The United States, Australia, the European Union, Japan, South Korea and other democracies should be encouraged to invest in hydropower, transmission, storage and grid technology. Their development banks, export-credit agencies and climate funds can provide long-term, low-cost capital, and their firms bring the standards of governance and cybersecurity Nepal needs. Partnership with democracies need not mean dependence; it means choice. 3. Special, transparent investment terms. Serious investors need certainty more than favours. Nepal should offer project-specific incentives that are published in full, a single window for approvals with fixed deadlines, bankable power-purchase agreements, and clear rules on who carries hydrological, geological and political risk. Every incentive should be tied to delivery: completed on time, the benefit continues; late, it ends. 4. Market guarantees, including for Chinese-backed projects. Chinese companies should not automatically be excluded. Where they are commercially and technically competitive, they can take part, under the same safeguards as everyone else. The real obstacle for Chinese-built plants is the market, since India's cross-border electricity rules restrict purchases from projects linked to companies of neighbouring countries with which it has no power-sector agreement, which in practice means China. Nepal should negotiate openly with India and Bangladesh on power-purchase arrangements for such projects, so that investment decisions turn on cost and quality, not on politics after the dam is built. 5. National security safeguards for every investor. Ownership, control systems, digital infrastructure, grid access and transmission technology must undergo independent security assessments, whatever the investor's nationality. Nepal should create a small, professional critical-infrastructure security unit, separate from the utilities, with the authority to test and certify control systems, require local data storage for grid operations, and block equipment that fails. The same rules should apply to an Indian, Chinese, American or Nepali investor. Five principles should run through all of this. Nepal should not become dependent on any single country, contractor or financing source. Our hydropower must be built to international standards, completed on time and operated in Nepal's national interest. Every major contract, joint-venture ownership and power-purchase price should be public. Climate risk, including glacial lake outburst floods, must be priced into every project, as the August floods have shown. And Nepal must move from selling raw electricity to trading it, with storage, regional interconnections and digital trading platforms that let us sell when prices are highest. Reservoir risk and a solar future for Budhi Gandaki Nepal's next big hydropower bet is on large reservoirs: Budhi Gandaki (1,200 MW), Sunkoshi-2 (1,110 MW), Sunkoshi-3 (683 MW), Pancheshwar (6,480 MW) and Karnali Chisapani (10,800 MW), all of which remain stuck at various stages. Reservoirs give us something run-of-river plants cannot: stored water for the dry winter, when Nepal still imports power. But they also concentrate risk in a way we have not yet faced honestly. These dams will sit in one of the most seismically active and climate-exposed mountain ranges on earth. A major earthquake, a landslide into a reservoir, a glacial lake outburst flood upstream, a design flaw or a cyberattack on dam controls could release enormous volumes of water in hours. The consequences would not stop at our border. The Gandaki, Koshi and Karnali flow into the Ganga, and onward towards Bangladesh. A reservoir failure in Nepal would become a humanitarian disaster in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and the Bengal delta. That makes dam safety a regional security issue, and Nepal should treat it as one. Nepal should therefore propose three things to its neighbours: 1. A regional dam-safety compact with India and Bangladesh, covering independent safety reviews, shared seismic and hydrological monitoring, and joint emergency plans for downstream communities. 2. Real-time early warning, linking glacier and glacial-lake monitoring in the high Himalaya to reservoir operations and to warning systems in the plains, so that a threat detected in Nepal reaches villages in India and Bangladesh within minutes. 3. Shared cost for shared benefit. If downstream countries gain flood control, irrigation and dry-season water from Nepal's reservoirs, they should share the cost of making them safe. Solar in the Budhi Gandaki Valley, now Budhi Gandaki shows both the promise and the trap. The project was declared a national pride project in fiscal year 2012-13, with completion targeted for 2026-27. Instead of a dam, Nepal has a bill. The state has already spent about Rs 46 billion, much of it on compensation, now converted into equity. Its base cost is around Rs 374 billion, the government still needs to find about Rs 228 billion, and on 16 October the Cabinet approved in principle a new Budhigandaki Development Authority Bill, the latest in a long series of changes of plan. Some 8,117 households in Gorkha and Dhading have been affected while they wait. Nepal should not let that investment sit idle for another decade. With land acquired, access roads planned, the valley close to the load centres of Kathmandu, Chitwan and Pokhara, and a dedicated authority being created, the government should invite major Indian energy groups such as Adani or Jindal, alongside other credible bidders, to begin large-scale solar development in the Budhi Gandaki Valley immediately. The case is strong: • It uses what the state has already paid for. Acquired land above the future reservoir line, valley slopes and, later, the reservoir surface itself for floating solar can all produce power. • It diversifies the energy mix. Solar peaks in the dry season, when river flows fall and Nepal imports electricity. It complements hydropower rather than competing with it. • It reduces excessive dependence on reservoirs. Not every megawatt needs to come from a high dam in an earthquake zone. • It is fast. A solar plant can be built in one to two years, not fifteen. Revenue can begin while the dam question is settled. • It brings Indian buyers with Indian investors. Power from an Adani or Jindal plant in Nepal will have a natural market in India, strengthening the case for open transmission. • It gives the affected families something now: jobs, lease income and local benefit-sharing, after years of displacement and waiting. Solar in Budhi Gandaki would not replace the reservoir debate. It would end the waste of waiting, and give Nepal an additional source of clean energy for domestic use and regional trade. Beyond electricity: what Prime Minister Shah should carry to New Delhi Hydropower is the heart of the Nepal–India relationship, but it is not the whole of it. The visit agenda already includes a $2 billion request for flood reconstruction support, the Pancheshwar project, the Lower Arun, the Kalapani and Susta boundary questions and the new Ayodhya–Janakpur railway. Several further items deserve a place at the table. Nepal can pursue project-based partnerships with India built around shared civilizational, economic and strategic interests. Greater Pashupatinath, Muktinath and Lumbini could become three pillars of that cooperation: sites that are sacred to hundreds of millions of people on both sides of the border, that draw Indian pilgrims in large numbers, and that Nepal alone has the right to protect and govern. A Greater Pashupatinath, built by Nepal Pashupatinath is one of the holiest sites in the Hindu world, and Guhyeshwari, its sacred companion across the Bagmati, belongs in the same plan. Nepal should launch a Greater Pashupatinath master plan covering both temples, the Bagmati banks, Mrigasthali, Gaurighat and the approach roads. It should restore the river, manage crowds safely, give pilgrims proper facilities and protect the living rituals that make the site sacred. India's experience in redeveloping its own great temple precincts can be valuable, and Indian pilgrims are the site's largest foreign visitors. But the design, ownership and religious authority must remain Nepali, guided by the Pashupati Area Development Trust and the priests who serve the temple. Partnership, yes; control, never. Lumbini: say it clearly, and make pilgrims stay The Buddha was born in Lumbini, in Nepal. This is a fact recognised by UNESCO, and it should be stated plainly in every joint statement and every Buddhist circuit promoted by both governments. Nepal should ask India to affirm it together in writing, and to market Lumbini as the birthplace in all official Buddhist circuit material. Beyond words, the goal is length of stay. Too many pilgrims visit Lumbini as a short stop on an India-based tour and leave the same day. Nepal should seek joint circuit packages that build in at least two nights in Lumbini, easier border crossing for circuit tourists, and joint promotion with Bodh Gaya, Sarnath and Kushinagar, so that the birthplace becomes a destination, not a detour. Muktinath: the Himalayan pilgrimage Muktinath, high in Mustang, is sacred to both Hindus and Buddhists. For Vaishnavites it is one of the 108 divine abodes of Vishnu; for Buddhists it is Chumig Gyatsa, a place of the dakinis. Every year it draws thousands of Indian pilgrims on a journey that should be one of the great pilgrimages of Asia, yet is too often hampered by weather-bound flights, rough roads and thin facilities. A joint Muktinath pilgrimage project could fund safe all-weather access, medical and rescue support at altitude, clean water, waste management and pilgrim shelters, while leaving the temple, its management and the fragile Mustang landscape in Nepali and local hands. Linked by air and road to Pokhara and Lumbini, it would complete a Nepali sacred circuit from the plains to the high Himalaya. Air routes for Bhairahawa and Pokhara Nepal has spent more than Rs 60 billion on Gautam Buddha International Airport and Pokhara International Airport, yet both remain under-used because India has not granted the western air-entry routes Nepal has sought for years. Without them, flights must take long, costly detours, and airlines stay away. Technical talks on Bhairahawa have finally been agreed. The Prime Minister should press for a time-bound decision on high-altitude entry routes for both airports. An airport that serves Lumbini pilgrims is in India's interest as much as ours. Access to the sea Air connectivity and access to seaports must sit side by side on the agenda. Almost all of Nepal's trade with third countries passes through India, mainly through Kolkata, Haldia and Visakhapatnam. Recent steps are welcome: in July the first direct rail cargo service from Kolkata to Biratnagar began, extending rail access beyond Birgunj for the first time. But Nepal's requests for access to Mundra in Gujarat and Dhamra in Odisha remain under consideration. Nepal should ask for more port options, faster customs clearance, transit rights granted as a standing entitlement rather than renewed case by case, and a road and rail corridor to Bangladesh's ports at Mongla and Chattogram. For a landlocked country, access to the sea is not a favour. It is the basis of our economic freedom. From projects to a regional framework Nepal and India have spent decades negotiating one project at a time: a dam here, a transmission line there, an air route postponed for years. That approach is slow, and it leaves every project hostage to the politics of the moment. Nepal should propose a broader regional partnership framework that links energy, water safety, connectivity, trade and pilgrimage tourism into one package, with clear timelines and joint review. Such a framework could include India, Bangladesh and Bhutan, and draw on existing platforms such as BBIN and BIMSTEC. Nepal can take part fully without abandoning its existing international relationships. We can work closely with India while maintaining our partnerships with the United States, Europe, Japan and others, and while keeping a constructive relationship with China. A framework of this kind would make Nepal not a buffer to be managed, but a partner to be valued. A relationship between peoples, not old channels For decades, Delhi has managed its relationship with Nepal through a small circle of familiar politicians. That model has failed both countries. The Gen Z movement of September 2025 was a verdict on the old political class: on Prachanda, Deuba and Oli, and equally on the next generation of the same parties, including Gagan Thapa, Pradeep Paudel and Bishwa Prakash Sharma, who rose inside that system and have not offered a break from it. Prime Minister Shah should tell his Indian counterparts, respectfully but clearly, that the old channels no longer speak for Nepal. India's partner is the Nepali state and the Nepali people, through their elected government, not party factions or intermediaries. What Nepal's democratic partners must understand India, the United States, Europe, Australia and Japan often divide Nepali politics into a simple map: the communists lean towards Beijing, the Nepali Congress leans towards the democracies. That map is out of date, and partners who rely on it risk backing the very forces that weaken them. The truth is that Beijing's influence in Nepal now runs across party lines. The Pokhara International Airport scandal, built under the Belt and Road banner, produced a chargesheet in which almost every major party, the Nepali Congress, the UML and the Maoist Centre, has representatives named. The pattern is familiar: large infrastructure contracts, opaque financing, and political networks that profit regardless of which flag flies over the ministry. The Chinese Communist Party has long worked through party-to-party ties to secure Nepal's commitments on Tibet, Taiwan and the BRI. Old-party leaders who speak the language of democracy in Delhi or Washington have too often bent to Beijing when it mattered, and used that backing to settle scores with their rivals at home. Within these parties, a quieter pattern deserves attention. Leaders from the Himalayan constituencies, the northern districts that border Tibet and know the realities of that frontier, are too often pushed to the margins. So are those who argue openly for partnership with the world's democracies. They are inconvenient to a leadership that prefers to keep every door open for itself rather than for Nepal. The contracts discussed in this article belong to the same story. Upper Tamakoshi and Sunkoshi–Marin show how delays, variation orders and cancelled tenders create money that flows somewhere. Nepalis have a right to know where. The Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority and an independent parliamentary inquiry should examine the contractors, intermediaries and joint-venture partners on these projects, including any financial ties to party leaders or their networks, and any foreign source of funds. If nothing is found, reputations will be cleared. If something is found, it must be prosecuted, whatever the party. For New Delhi in particular, the lesson is direct. It is puzzling that Indian interlocutors continue to cultivate the same old-party figures whose loyalties have proved so flexible. The Gen Z movement has opened a door that may not open again: a new political force, elected on a promise of clean government and national dignity. India should engage it as a partner, not hedge against it by backing Prime Minister Shah's rivals inside or outside his party. A stable, reforming government in Kathmandu that welcomes Indian investment on fair terms is worth far more to India than any network of old friends. Symbols matter too. Beyond the guard of honour and the formal talks, there could be a moment when the two prime ministers each wear the other's national dress: Prime Minister Modi in Nepal's daura suruwal and dhaka topi, Prime Minister Shah in Indian attire. A simple gesture of that kind would say more about equality and friendship between two sovereign nations than any communiqué. Conclusion: sovereignty through competition Nepal stands at a rare moment. India's demand for power is growing fast, Bangladesh wants to buy, democracies are looking for trusted clean-energy partners in Asia, and Chinese capital remains available. A small country squeezed between giants can either be pulled by each in turn, or it can make them compete. Nepal's non-membership in rival blocs, our democratic character and our position at the meeting point of South Asia and the Tibetan plateau give us room to choose the second path. That path demands discipline at home. No more national pride projects that take twenty years. No more contracts awarded to the lowest bidder and then renegotiated upward. No more joint ventures whose real owners are hidden. No grid equipment installed without a security test. No reservoir built without a regional safety plan. No acquired land, like the Budhi Gandaki Valley, left idle while solar power could be flowing from it. And no more foreign policy run through party back channels instead of the state. The objective is not to choose one geopolitical camp over another. It is to use competition between global investors to Nepal's advantage, while protecting our sovereignty, our energy security and our economic future. Our rivers, our temples, our birthplace of the Buddha and our skies are national assets. They must be developed by Nepal, for Nepal, with the world as our partner and no single power as our master. Rajendra Bajgain is a former Member of Parliament from Gorkha, a Himalayan rescue worker and founder of Gurkha Encounters. He resigned from Parliament in September 2025.