Lok Sabha polls: Seven lessons from seven decades
Published: 11:07 am Jun 04, 2024
Now that the results of the Lower House elections in India are due to be announced, the attention of the people, voters and non-voters, pollsters and psephologists is riveted on what June 4 brings. While a clean sweep by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and National Democratic Alliance (NDA) looks obvious, another curiosity hovering in everyone's mind is: with the magic figure of 272 in its pocket, will it cross 400, its claim mark?
Analysis suggests that over the last three elections, the BJP strength in the seats of the Lok Sabha rose steadily: from 0.73 in 2009 to 0.84 in 2014 and further to a 0.86 high in 2019 in contrast to the steady decline of Congress: 0.79 (2009), 0.73 (2014), and 0.56 (2019). The foremost lesson these figures bring is that voters can be deceived for a while, but not always. If the regime governing delivers, voters will respond accordingly. This reversal of the dynasty that ruled India for decades and the rise in turn of a figure whose origin could hardly have been more humble offer us the second lesson. The voters may look for charisma and background, but only up to a certain point. If the leadership stops delivering, voters will stop their support and seek an alternative, particularly if it delivers better and is serious about what it says. The Indian electorate is more sensitive and enlightened than before.
The ban clamped on Teen Talaq must have switched millions of female Muslim votes to the BJP from Congress, alienated by the timid decision the then government took to appease the orthodox among a certain minority. The lesson that follows next is: Appeasement works but its overuse also backfires, like an antibiotic or how the Munich Pact hit Great Britain and France.
Compared to the NDA:UPA ratio of seats estimated by the exit polls for the three elections (0.95 for 2009, 2.7 for 2014, and 2.6 for 2019), the ratio for seats won stood at 0.60 (2009), 5.6 (2014), and 3.8 (2019). The largest figure 5.6 of 2014 may not only reflect the failure of the exit polls to estimate the measure of the BJP wave in 2014, but could arguably have adumbrated the aspirations long dormant and rising among the voters over the way issues were raised and agendas were set up (ownership of issues and agendas). This brings to mind the sympathy wave sweeping India in 1984 when two prominent editors from Delhi somehow misfired on their projection, compared to the closer estimates of this observer featured then in a national daily of Kathmandu. The fourth lesson: the sympathy wave does not sustain long, and analysis based on empirical evidence helps.
Given the trends against the background of a large number of candidates entitled to contest, representation in India still resembles a condominium of rich males and criminal mafias. Over 88 per cent of the candidates from the major parties are crorepatis; the share of females, half of the country's population, remains puny, and is often absent; and among the 1,352 contesting, 244 (18%) hold a proven criminal background. The success achieved by Yogi's government in smashing the hold of the dons and mafias in that crime-laden province not only deserves kudos for this feat but also shows a firm hand and dedication bring results.
That the exit poll predictions bear a checkered record on seat estimation may reflect a lack of forthrightness on the part of respondents. However, the precision achieved by Gallup and Harris Polls in the USA suggests improvement in this regard is possible.
Finally, a third term implies not merely another five years of safe sailing for the winners but more importantly, stability and continuity of the programmes and projects launched, in other words, institutionalisation of the policies and possible achievement of the agendas and goals set up. The implications this bears and the inferences one could draw could be of high academic as well as applied value for this largest open democracy and others.
At the cusp of its entry to the Security Council with a veto, this may be what matters most to India. As for the claim-mark on the seats, which Prof. Subramanian Swamy puts at 220, this observer will not be surprised if it veers somewhere around 375. And, if it does, the winning alliance may have partly to thank for the scams swirling and refusing to settle about Bibhav Kumar, Sandeshkhali as well as Sonia Gandhi.
(The author thanks Sanjog Deo and Sri Kushal Basnyat for the help rendered in the course of information made available.)