Suicide attacks have become a major factor in the current resurgence of violence in Afghanistan, indicating Al Qaeda is staging a comeback. So far this year, there have been 32 suicide terrorist attacks, more than the total committed in the entire history of the country. Despite Afghanistan’s three-decade long conflict, the first recorded suicide attack in Afghanistan did not occur until September 9, 2001 — just two days before the September 11 terrorist strikes in the US.

Two Al Qaeda members posing as members of the media blew themselves up and assassinated Ahmad Shah Masoud, leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. The second suicide terrorist attack in Afghanistan took place in 2002, followed by two such attacks in 2003, six in 2004, and 21 in 2005.

The increasing use of suicide terrorism has contributed to an ever larger number of total insurgent attacks. According to the RAND Corporation terrorist incident database, the total number of insurgent attacks and deaths caused by these attacks has quadrupled since 2002.

First, Al Qaeda and the Taliban have successfully tapped into the expertise and training of

the broader jihadi community.

Second, Al Qaeda and the Taliban have concluded that suicide bombing is more effective than other tactics in killing Afghan and coalition forces. Third, Al Qaeda and the Taliban believe that suicide attacks have increased the level of insecurity among the Afghan

population. This has caused some Afghans to question the government’s ability to protect them and has further destabilised the authority of local government institutions. Fourth, suicide attacks have provided renewed visibility for the Taliban and Al Qaeda, which previous guerrilla attacks did not generate.

Because of their lethality and high profile nature, every suicide attack is reported in the national and international media.

How can the US and Afghan governments counter the growing use of suicide attacks? Lessons from Iraq, Israel, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere suggest that at least three steps are critical: improving intelligence, increasing law-enforcement capabilities, and countering extremist ideology.

The Afghan government must enhance the capacity of its intelligence services to disrupt the

suicide support network by better infiltrating the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Police training should also be enhanced to better deal with suicide tactics. Currently, Afghan national police go through several weeks of training, but receive no specific training on threat assessment for suicide attacks.

Most important, the Afghan Ulama, or council of religious leaders, need to continue playing a major role in countering the extremist ideology of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. It is also important for the Ulama to emphasise that the battle in Afghanistan is not between Islam and the West, but between forces of progress and those who wish for Afghanistan to remain weak and divided. — The Christian Science Monitor