Jan Sharma

By storming the district headquarters of Myangdi, the Maobadis have asserted that they have enhanced their military capability to strike any target any time anywhere in Nepal. The attack flies on the face of many, including the members of the Royal government, who have been claiming that the Maobadis have lost the steam, largely because of the beefed up security arrangement under the “unified command” of the security forces.

The March 21 devastating attack on Beni left 24 security personnel dead. The Maobadis are believed to have suffered heavy casualties. The Royal Nepalese Army spokesperson Colonel

Dipak Gurung claimed that 500 Maobadis could have died in the exchange of gunfire.

The Maobadis on their website have claimed they killed 150 security personnel and captured 137 “modern” weapons, including 15 infantry small arms system, eight sub-machine guns, three light machine guns, one M 16, 35 self-loading rifles and 47,000 rounds of ammunitions.

The Beni blitz came 18 days after the eastern district headquarter of Bhojpur had come under attack on March 2. Both the attacks were meticulously planned and executed. If the Maobadis came in the strength of 5,000 to Beni, they had come to Bhojpur in the strength of 2,000. The security forces claimed they lost 32 soldiers while the Maobadis claimed to have killed 40. They had also looted arms and ammunitions just like they did from Beni. On both occasions, they left several government buildings destroyed but without the money they had planned to loot from the banks. The cash and gold have been in the safe custody of the security forces since the commercial banks became the prime target.

The Maobadis have recently been talking about shift from “decentralised action” to “major centralised action.” This is a significant because they are no more talking about the “strategic balance” they used to during the second ceasefire, which collapsed on August 27. Recent Maobadi writings refer to what they call “strategic aggression,” perhaps indicating the Beni and Baglung attacks. It is hard to believe that the attacks are actually aimed at exerting pressure on the current regime to announce a ceasefire and open fresh rounds of talks. The Maobadis are not genuinely interested in talks. They also do realise that the guns will never bring them to power in Nepal nor can the Royal Nepalese Army crush them.

The intent of the recent attacks is therefore to prove that the Maobadi military capacity is “superior” to that of the Royal Nepalese Army despite the international military assistance and training. They enjoy relative advantage of mobility and the familiarity of the treacherous geographical terrain. Their advantage is the state army’s disadvantage. It is doubtful if the Maobadis wanted to capture the district headquarters, as the army claims. The Maobadis have proven the extent of damage they can inflict in the heavily fortified district headquarters. But they also know that they simply do not have the capacity to continue to maintain their hold. If they do it, they would be walking into a suicide trap because of the enhanced capacity of the government security forces.

So, why are they attacking district headquarters? They perhaps want to demonstrate their fighting skills. They want to test their military planning. They want to test how efficiently and effectively they can implement their planning in actual action. The military strength, according to the Maobadi thinking, reinforces their political organisation, which in fact they control. This situation is also a God-send opportunity for the Royal Nepalese Army to transform itself from a largely ceremonial force to a merit-based, modern fighting force.

It is not clear whether major attacks are on the cards. There is no doubt that the Maoists want to impress upon the populace fade up with the infighting between and among the constitutional forces - including the King and the political parties. They have in any case successfully hounded political parties in the western hills they control.

The Maobadis today are as unpopular as are the political parties. One introduced the country to misrule and corruption. The other introduced violence and cruelty. The Maobadis were initially popular among the rural people, and a majority had accepted them as a political force to reckon with. That was the time when they were not as violent and ruthless as they are today. Everything began to change after they resorted to violence and cruelty soon after the mysterious assassination of popular King Birendra and his entire family. Many feel betrayed when the Maobadis failed to evolve as a political formation to represent the voices of the downtrodden and the excluded.

The rebels have said they are engaged in “strategic offensive” focusing on district headquarters. Much of the strategic thinking of the regime is also focused on district headquarters. The Maoists will face difficulties in achieving results they expect from such attacks. It seems to be the Maoists thinking that continued attack will ultimately weaken the state and strengthen their relative advantage. This means clashes will be more violent and casualties higher. Both sides are pointing their guns on democracy. Unfortunately, only people without guns and yearning for democracy and freedom are talking about the prospects of reviving peace.