Max Hastings

British troops are stuck in Afghanistan until Barack Obama recognises the war is unwinnable. Simon Jenkins has argued in the Guardian for recognition of failure in Afghanistan. I share his analysis of the west’s predicament. But I find it impossible to believe the British government will precipitate a crisis in Anglo-American relations by pulling out of the war. In the new year, President Barack Obama will arrive in Europe on a wave of public euphoria. One almost inevitable consequence is that the British government will commit more troops to a campaign that is going nowhere, because we are too deeply committed to do anything else.

The incoming Democratic administration is convinced Afghanistan is a “good war”, in a way that Iraq is not. General David Petraeus will be authorised by Obama to preside over a dramatically intensified military effort. It is hard to overstate the anger and resentment that will be roused in Washington if the major European powers refuse to play. The US military believes the Taliban are much weaker than western media suggest, and that an increased commitment can tip the balance towards stability. In recent months, the Taliban have interdicted supply convoys, inflicted many casualties, and generated huge profits by levying tolls on vehicles running the gauntlet from Pakistan.

The Obama administration plans to lean on President Hamid Karzai as Bush never has, to address the corruption and inefficiency of his regime. The Americans believe that, with additional troops, they can regain territory from the Taliban. They want to enlarge the Afghan army dramatically. Privately, they acknowledge that Afghanistan cannot afford a huge war machine. The average defence spend of developing nations is about 2% of GDP. To fund the 300,000 troops the US thinks necessary to secure the country, at a cost of $10,000 a man, Kabul would need to spend a crazy 20% of its GDP. Some Washington strategy gurus argue that the US military is promoting a model that is unsustainable.

The British army is chastened by its Afghan experience. Senior officers were rashly over-optimistic. Today, they realise they are making little progress in securing Helmand, and far less controlling the drug industry. The UK is getting scant thanks from the Americans. Even a reinforcement of, say, 3,000 UK troops is unlikely to alter fundamentals. More men are of limited value when the British are short of helicopter lift to deploy them outside their firebases. A retired general said : “How do we keep explaining dead British soldiers to the British people, when we are getting nowhere?”

Washington keeps asking its own big question: if the allies quit, abandoning Afghanistan to anarchy, what would be the impact on the region, especially on Pakistan? US pressure on Gordon Brown is likely to be increased by the fact that most Nato leaders will reject Obama’s appeals for extra troops. Because the British are engaged more deeply than any other ally, the new president will expect correspondingly more from us. We cannot walk off the set unless we wish to pay the price of being seen by the American people, as well as by their government, to betray the Atlantic alliance. Only if or when Obama decides that the game is not worth the candle will the boys come home.