What has emerged is that weakness appears like strength in coalition governance. If we peep back into the nineties, the RPP led the coalition government
KATHMANDU, FEBRUARY 20
The newly found coalition politics in Nepal appears to be tottering on the precipice of uncertainty.
It was triggered by the request of Prime Minister Prachanda for support to the Nepali Congress(NC), which was responded with unusual alacrity. This support catapulted Prachanda to dizzy heights of popularity with more than 99 per cent of support in the parliament.
It also brought politics of national consensus upfront, which was otherwise shelved onto the back burner of Nepali politics for a long time.
What has, however, emerged is that weakness appears like strength in coalition governance. If we peep back to the nineties, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP)led the coalition government while the Nepali Congress and the Unified Marxist- Leninist(UML) were taken for a ride like a mahout controlling the elephants.
First, the RPP under Lokendra Bahadur Chand led the UML-backed government in 1997 for a mere six months. Later, Surya Bahadur Thapa emulated the act, riding on the shoulder of the NC the same year. The coalition of the UML and Maoist Centre (MC) was led by the former after the election held in Federal Nepal, but it could not last long. Again a new five-party coalition was formed, which was led by the NC, and the larger party, the UML, was left licking the political wounds in the opposition bench. And now the MC is leading the government with the NC straying along the political side lines.
Our constitution has recognised the strength of the parties. Accordingly, para 75 (1) has provided for the formation of the government by the party enjoying the majority in the parliament.
The present mode of proportional representation has, however, made majority next to impossible.
Para 75 (3) has also room for the largest party in the parliament to form the government, but it has to prove the majority within 30 days of the formation of the government, for which again it has to depend on the smaller parties for support, bringing back the situation to 75 (2) court.
Political parties have to take resort to Para (2) which again puts the larger parties in favour of the smaller parties, leading to strength is a weakness trap.
The so-called strength is weakness effect was theorised by T. Caplow in 1956 when he wrote that members of a triad may differ in strength, following which strong members try to dominate the weaker members. But when the combined strength of the two weaker members is adequate to control the strongest member, the two weak members would form a coalition against the strong member.
This was glaringly seen in the formation of the seven-party coalition led by the MC with the support of the UML. The NC thought that it was rational to claim for the leadership of the coalition on virtue of being the largest party. The weak members – UML and MC – because of their lesser representation with 78 and 32 seats in the parliament compared to the NC's 89 seats, formed a coalition.
Such a phenomenon can be observed in a modified Pachisi game, known as pasha in Nepali. If three players A, B and C with weightage of 3, 2 and 2 play for the monetary benefit upon reaching the top of the Pachisi board and roll the dice relative to their strength, it is A that wins the game ordinarily. But if B and C agree on sharing the monetary pay off, and one of them, either B or C reaches the last point. They add up and win the game.
This could be seen in the seven-party coalition where the parties agreed to sharing of posts in the federal and provincial government, with the result that they formed the government, leaving the NC, the largest party in the parliament, high and dry.
Several hypotheses have been put forward to explain this phenomenon. The first is the confusion hypothesis, where the strong bargainer incorrectly considers oneself higher up on the basis of more resources available with the result that the weak bargainers are quick to form a coalition.
It could be seen in the formation of the seven-party coalition when the smaller parties were already assembled at Balkot, with the NC at Baluwatar caught virtually unawares.
The other hypothesis known as the conspiracy hypothesis consists of the weaker parties entering into a coalition because they think that it equalises the unfair advantage owned by the strong bargainer.
The general secretary of the MC, Dev Gurung, had justified the MC forming the government despite being a distant third because Para 75 (3) provides the opportunity to a Lilliputian party to lead even in the presence of giant parties.
The third one is the equity hypothesis where the strong bargainers demand a high share of the pay-off, prompting the weak bargainers again to enter into a coalition. In all the three cases, it is the high bargainer that has to bear the brunt of the disadvantage.
These theories and the hypotheses explain the coalition's existence till the support of the NC to the government. But the theory that explains the present scenario where the UML and MC have been driven to political differences is of concern in Nepal's politics.
It has come into being because of the UML's refusal to give up the presidential berth to the NC, and the MC opposing the UML for creating consensus politics in the country in view of the slumping economy and the rise of rightist elements represented by the RPP.
This can be explained by what could be called the chaotic hypothesis. In politics, it is used to explain the political situation which is at random and unpredictable.
It is at random because the opposition party has to oppose the government by its very name. But the opposition party, the NC, has supported the government, which is seldom the case in parliamentary democracy.
It is interesting that the NC had earlier exhibited such erratic behaviour by supporting the policy and programme of the coalition government of the UML and MC, led by K P Oli, which had surprised the political observers in the country.
What has emerged is that weakness appears like strength in coalition governance. If we peep back into the nineties, the RPP led the coalition government
A version of this article appears in the print on February 21, 2023, of The Himalayan Times.
