In 86 days since the proclamation of the Interim Constitution (IC), the cabinet on Tuesday decided to introduce in the 329-member parliament a nine-point second amendment to the constitution. Among the most prominent are provisions under which the interim parliament can remove the Prime Minister by a two-thirds majority or abolish the institution of monarchy in the same way if the virtually suspended King erected a “serious obstacle” to the holding of the constituent assembly (CA) elections. The necessity of both has been widely felt. Other proposed changes include: the PM can seek a vote of confidence in the House; 25 per cent of the MPs can summon a special session; the requirement for a political consensus to induct a non-MP into the cabinet; the provision of the opposition benches; the fixing of the date for the CA polls for June 20; and restriction of parliamentary hearing only to the nominees recommended by the Constitutional Council.

Since the Prime Minister cannot remain above the parliament, he cannot be supposed to remain in office without the parliament’s support. The IC had not taken account of this worldwide practice. As the interim Prime Minister epitomises the consensus of the eight political parties that had led Jana Andolan II, when this consensus falls apart, the Prime Minister loses the authority to continue in office. The IC provides that the PM is chosen on the basis of an eight-party consensus, and only when it is unavailable that the person commanding a two-thirds majority of the parliament becomes the Prime Minister. While the eight-party unanimity or parliamentary support is essential, the requirement of a two-thirds majority instead of a majority of just over 50 per cent, as is the prevailing practice, sounds awkward and may rather give rise to a constitutional or political crisis. What if the eight parties cannot agree and neither side can muster a two-thirds majority?

The provision relating to the monarchy is clearly aimed at deterring the palace, which has been accused of trying to foment trouble, from any possible manoeuvre against the CA polls. As for the opposition benches, the proposed change does not sit well in a parliament that has been formed to reflect the mandate of Jana Andolan, not the electoral mandate. What should be remembered is that the interim parliament is not a continuation of the restored parliament, but an entirely new one created differently and for a specific purpose. The incorporation of the date for the CA polls in the IC is not the normal practice the world over, but it will be harmless provided that the polls can be held on schedule. However, legal complications are likely to arise if the government cannot keep this date. So this aspect merits attention. Regarding parliamentary confirmation of certain high-level government nominations, the move to restrict, rather than widen, its scope, is a sad one. This would kill the beauty of the system — something which has long been practised in the United States and appreciated elsewhere for the brake it puts on wrong executive decisions.