Nepal does not lack channels of engagement with India. What it often lacks is a strategy for converting access into influence. That requires clearer public messaging, informed parliamentary engagement, and stronger follow-up after high-level meetings
When NDTV World, an Indian television news platforms, brought its Anviksha: Ideas Across Borders dialogue to Kathmandu on August 27, Nepal gained rare access not only to Indian political and diplomatic figures, but also to parliamentarians, journalists, opinion-makers, and a large Indian audience.
Participants included Nepal's foreign and finance ministers and political leaders, alongside Shashi Tharoor, chair of India's parliamentary Committee on External Affairs, and Sumnima Udas, chair of Nepal's International Relations and Tourism Committee.
But dialogue should be judged by what it achieves.
In an earlier article in The Himalayan Times, "Beyond handshakes: Nepal needs agenda-led diplomacy," I argued that Nepal's foreign engagements should be judged by what Nepal puts on the table, what it seeks to achieve and what follows.
On one of the most sensitive unresolved issues between Nepal and India – the boundary dispute – Kathmandu appears to have missed an important opportunity.
Foreign Minister Shisir Khanal was directly asked about the issue. He struck a conciliatory tone, saying boundary problems are natural between neighbours, that most boundary work had been completed and that the dispute was "not as big as it is made out to be". He stressed continued dialogue and the revival of bilateral mechanisms. But de-escalation does not require ambiguity.
An Indian viewer could have left without understanding what Nepal claims, why, or what remains unresolved. Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh, and Kalapani were explained more clearly through NDTV's contextual reporting than through Nepal's presentation. That is striking because during his June visit to India, Khanal told the media that Nepal considered the disputed land its own, referring to the 1816 Treaty of Sugauli and confirming that Nepal had conveyed its objection.
So what happened after his talks with External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar? At Anviksha, Khanal referred to his recent Delhi visit. But he did not clearly explain what had been discussed on the territorial dispute, whether there had been progress, which mechanism would take the issue forward, or what the next political step should be. Nepal's official account of the June talks did not publicly specify the territorial dispute.
Recent Nepal-India meetings in Lucknow and Dehradun on survey work and border management are useful. But technical work on pillars, cross-border occupation, encroachment, security, and routine border management is not the same as negotiating disputed territory. Current technical work under the BWG framework excludes Kalapani-Limpiyadhura-Lipulekh and Susta. The central question remains: which mechanism is actually moving towards a resolution on them?
Nepal's larger weakness may be that it has treated this issue mainly as government-to-government diplomacy. But how much effort has Nepal made to explain its position directly to the people of India? That is public diplomacy. It does not mean persuading Indians that Nepal is right and India is wrong. It means ensuring that Indian parliamentarians, journalists, scholars, and citizens understand that Nepal has a position based on historical treaties, facts, maps, and evidence, and that Nepal seeks a negotiated settlement.
Anviksha was precisely such a platform. Nepal could have explained its case calmly, acknowledged India's differing position, linked the issue to ministerial discussions and clarified the next step it seeks. Nepal cannot not ask Indian parliamentarians to advocate its territorial claim. But it should want them to understand the issue well enough to ask their own government informed questions.
What has been discussed? What remains unresolved? What political process does New Delhi envisage? Those are legitimate questions in any democracy.
Nepal could also encourage structured dialogue between the relevant parliamentary committees. It cannot replace negotiation, but can deepen understanding and keep unresolved questions visible.
Anviksha also brought together senior figures from Nepal's government and different political parties. That created an opportunity to project the boundary question as a national position rather than a party position. Governments change. Nepal's message should remain consistent: it values its relationship with India, stands by its territorial position, and seeks a negotiated settlement.
Nepal does not lack channels of engagement with India. What it often lacks is a strategy for converting access into influence. That requires clearer public messaging, informed parliamentary engagement, and stronger follow-up after high-level meetings. Nepal could prepare a concise public explanation of its position, supported by key historical documents and maps, for Indian media, universities, think tanks, and parliamentarians.
But communication alone is not enough. Kathmandu should also define a concrete diplomatic objective. If the technical mechanisms cannot address Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura, then Nepal should state which political forum it wants activated: a dedicated foreign-secretary process, foreign-ministerial dialogue, a revived joint commission mandate, or direction from the two prime ministers.
A useful next step would be agreement on a political channel, regular meetings, and a process for examining each side's evidence. Even without immediate settlement, that would distinguish movement from routine engagement. Nepal should then report publicly, in measured terms, what was discussed, what remains unresolved, and when the next meeting is expected. That would create continuity between private diplomacy and public accountability. Without a clear pathway, bilateral mechanisms risk becoming activity without outcome.
NDTV created a rare forum in Kathmandu where difficult questions could be raised before an Indian audience. The missed opportunity was not the platform's.
For one day, Kathmandu had India's ear. The question is whether Nepal truly used it.
Ghale is a global health, policy, and diplomacy enthusiast