Washington is moving away from sweeping democracy-promotion and towards selective engagement with states that offer strategic utility or economic complementarity – criteria Nepal can meet
The 2025 United States National Security Strategy (NSS) marks a decisive shift in Washington's global posture. It abandons the broad, values-centric framing of earlier strategies and replaces it with a more selective, outcomes-driven approach rooted in economic priorities and hemispheric consolidation. For Nepal, this creates a landscape defined less by grand geopolitics and more by practical alignment with U.S. interests.
The strategy revives a modernised Monroe Doctrine by prioritising stability, migration control, and economic strength in the Western Hemisphere. Asia remains important, but primarily through an economic lens. China is treated chiefly as a commercial competitor rather than an ideological rival, while Russia, the Middle East, and Africa receive restrained attention. This indicates that Washington intends to limit diffuse global commitments while reinforcing targeted strategic domains.
South Asia is particularly affected by this shift. India, long a cornerstone of U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific, remains central under the new NSS, yet the framing is transactional: India is valued for its economic capacity, technology partnership potential, and ability to share the burden of regional deterrence against China. Crucially, the NSS and the broader Trump strategic posture signal recognition of India's multi-alignment: New Delhi can sustain robust ties with Russia, including in defense and energy, while deepening U.S. cooperation. The timing is telling: President Putin's visit to India coincides with the NSS release, underscoring India's strategic autonomy and the limits of American influence.
For Nepal, this recalibration means U.S. engagement will be selective and transactional. Unlike India or key Indo-Pacific states, Nepal will not be central to U.S. regional security planning. Instead, Washington will focus on areas where Nepal offers tangible contributions – critical minerals, clean energy, digital infrastructure, and good-governance reforms.
The reduced U.S. focus on South Asia presents both risks and openings. While Nepal may experience less high-level political attention, it also gains greater room to maintain foreign-policy autonomy. With careful diplomacy, Nepal can leverage selective U.S. programmes while balancing relations with China and India. This middle path will require avoiding entanglement in major-power rivalry while maximising economic and technological cooperation.
The NSS also underscores a shift towards performance-based aid. For Nepal, this means opportunities in hydropower development, climate adaptation, digital systems, and mineral exploration, provided transparency and institutional reliability can be demonstrated. Hydropower, in particular, aligns with US priorities on climate and regional energy interdependence.
In the broader Indo-Pacific context, Washington emphasises burden-sharing rather than direct confrontation. Nepal is not expected to take political stances on Taiwan or China's rise, but U.S. engagement will increasingly follow an economic and competitive rationale, not ideological alignment. This reinforces the importance of Nepal maintaining neutrality while pursuing issue-based cooperation.
Soft-power opportunities also remain. Education partnerships, governance support, and technical training offer pathways for strengthening ties without geopolitical risk. Nepal's value to the US lies not in strategic positioning but in being a reliable developmental and economic partner capable of delivering consistent results. Demonstrating administrative coherence and regulatory predictability will be essential.
To navigate this environment, Nepal must identify sectors where U.S. priorities intersect with national development goals and ensure reforms that attract long-term investment. At the same time, Kathmandu must preserve strong ties with China and India, ensuring that cooperation with Washington does not compromise critical regional relationships.
Under the new NSS, Nepal-US relations will remain stable but evolve towards a more focussed partnership rooted in energy, digital development, climate resilience, and institutional performance. Washington is moving away from sweeping democracy-promotion and towards selective engagement with states that offer strategic utility or economic complementarity – criteria Nepal can meet.
Energy and connectivity will form the backbone of expanded cooperation. The US is likely to deepen involvement in transmission infrastructure, feasibility studies, and financing mechanisms that strengthen Nepal's export capacity and regional energy stability.
Digital infrastructure and cyber resilience will be a second priority. With Washington intent on countering technological dependence on China, Nepal's efforts in telecom diversification, digital regulation, and startup development align with U.S. objectives. Expect support in secure networks, digital payments frameworks, and regulatory modernisation.
Climate and disaster cooperation will grow as well. Nepal's vulnerability to climate change makes it a natural partner for U.S. climate diplomacy. Investments will likely target early-warning systems, adaptive agriculture, water management, and Himalayan ecosystem protection – areas that enhance resilience without involving political sensitivities.
Security cooperation will expand cautiously, focussed on non-militarised areas such as disaster response, counter-trafficking, aviation safety, and peacekeeping. The US has no intent to draw Nepal into strategic competition; cooperation will be functional rather than strategic.
Governance and development programmes will continue but with stronger performance metrics. Washington is less concerned with shaping political models and more with fostering institutions that enable credible economic partnerships.
Anti-corruption, judicial strengthening, and public financial management will remain central themes.
The trajectory of these engagements will depend heavily on Nepal's domestic stability and regulatory reliability. Consistent policy, coherent foreign-policy signaling, and improved ease of doing business – particularly in coordination with India – will be decisive in attracting deeper U.S. involvement.
Overall, the 2025 NSS points towards a partnership defined by practical cooperation, sectoral depth, and mutual benefit. Rather than sweeping geopolitical alignment, Nepal's engagement with the US will grow through targeted initiatives that support national development while fitting within Washington's narrower, efficiency-driven global strategy.
Basnyat is a strategic affairs analyst based in Kathmandu
