Method for arriving at inclusive institutions

Mahendra Lawoti

In one of the most, if not the most, cited political science work of the twentieth century, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls (1971) proposes a method through which a polity can come up with just institutions that are acceptable to the whole society. He calls the condition a veil of ignorance in the original position. The original position is the initial position from where a community chooses the institutions that will govern them. It is a hypothetical position imagined to facilitate a thought process. The veil of ignorance states that in the original position no one knows their race, ethnicity, gender, age, and other characteristics, such as whether they are strong or weak, skilled or unskilled, and so on. In absence of such information, the parties are likely to avoid a biased choice of governing principles. ‘The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This insures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain. For given the circumstances of the original position, the symmetry of everyone’s relations to each other, this initial situation is fair between individuals as moral persons…’

Rawls argues that if people were to arrive at decisions that affect the society without knowing who they are or their personal/group characteristics, they are most likely to come up with just institutions that do not favor the advantaged/dominant group. Instead, they will come up with institutions that will favor the disadvantaged groups because not knowing whether they will turn out to be members of the disadvantaged groups, people would ensure that if they were to, they are not faced with injustice. For instance, if a person does not know whether s/he is going to be a Bahun or dalit, that person is likely to opt for institutions that are just toward both the groups. In the Nepali scenario, s/he is going to adopt institutions that will address the historical and contemporary discrimination against the dalit because if s/he turns out to be a dalit, s/he would like to have a fair chance in life.

To make the issue more clear, we can pose the question from another angle to adapt for the defined positions (though not unchangeable) people already have in real life. Will a male Bahun wish to be reborn as a dalit, madhesi, Muslim, indigenous nationalities or a woman, if human wish were to be fulfilled? If he does not wish to be born as a member of any of these group, then one reason is because he knows that he will be disadvantaged if he were to be born into the groups, due to historical factors as well unjust current institutions. If the male Bahun thought that the contemporary institutions were fair and just toward all groups (and that he would not face injustice and can compete equally as a member of those groups), he would not have cared much whether he would be born as a woman, dalit, indigenous nationalities, and madhesi.

Since people reach decisions based on what they know and what they see from their positions, an agreement would be difficult to be reached in multicultural societies where people have different cultures, traditions, and worldviews. Rawls’ methodology can become very handy in such a situation. If the people at the original position, with veil of ignorance in effect, were to decide upon institutions to govern them collectively, they would attempt to be fair to the disadvantaged groups to avoid facing inequality and injustice if they turned out as members of the disadvantaged groups.

The veil of ignorance mechanism can be used for arriving at democratic political institutions that are fair and just toward different groups in Nepal. In a slightly revised way, the decision makers can imagine themselves as dalit, indigenous nationalities, women, Muslim, madhesi, Buddhist, or Christian. Which political institutions would they then favour among the ones that are being proposed?

For instance, if they imagined themselves as a Limbu, would they prefer a unitary structure that marginalizes his/her culture/group or a federal system that would allow cultural autonomy to different groups? If a person were to imagine oneself as a Buddhist, Muslim, Kiranti, or a Christian, would he or she prefer to live in a state that is declared Hindu? If that person was a linguistic minority (Maithili, Gurung etc.), would s/he favor institutions and policies that place his/her language as second class, limit it to primary education, and provide no governmental subsidies (whereas the state policies provides free residential education up to Ph.D. in Sanskrti)? If they were to be a member of a disadvantaged group, would they not favour affirmative action policies? The imagining of oneself in other groups’ positions would allow understanding of injustices other groups are facing and crafting of just and fair institutions. The uncertainty of one’s group identity in the original position with the veil of ignorance in effect would make people select institutions that are just toward all groups. They would opt for institutions that are inclusive because no one would like to imagine oneself as a member of an excluded group.

Dr. Lawoti is visiting assistant professor at Western Michigan University