Regime change: Is there real democracy in Nepal?
Most observers believe that Nepal’s democratisation is marching ahead. But the consolidation of democracy takes place only when the process becomes irreversible. If the goal of the April awakening last year was to empower people, create effective institutions and set up a stable system of governance, the current democratisation process manoeuvred by the whims and caprices of a few might run into such hurdles that it would be impossible to characterise the path the country is taking.
Following the demise of the royal rule, Nepali society has a good chance to institute democratisation; still we do not have a structure within which diverse social sectors could play their roles effectively during the transition period for more productive and robust democratisation movement. Nor do the political groups have specific plans to assure the people that they can provide a sound alternative to authoritarianism.
In fact, the parties, which can provide for an excellent mechanism for democratic transition, have been nothing more than a platform for the exercise of power according to the desires of a handful of leaders. They resort to any means necessary to keep the rival group out of power, whereas success of democratisation is possible only when the arena of polity is inclusive of all sides — the state, political society and civil society.
In fact, authoritarianism triumphs on the strength of anti-democratic forces in society. Nepal is no exception to this rule. Ours is a case of regime change without democratisation. Democratic consolidation is endangered the most by the inability of the so-called democrats and lumpen proletarians to convert themselves into authentic believers in democracy.
The major problems that have plagued the country and raised doubts about democracy relate to two potential superficialities — the lack of competence and creative consensus — and four potential susceptibilities — the eight-party tyranny, propaganda politics, subtle domination by a few elite minorities, and mass passivity. While we have made significant accomplishments against the authoritarian regime, we have not contained authoritarianism altogether. Neither have we attained the level of vibrancy necessary to ensure the irreversibility of democracy.
Virtually all processes of democratic transition, including those accompanying a negotiated settlement of the conflict, look like “a game - a tug of war so to speak - between those in power and those in opposition.” There can be no consolidation without
stability, but mere stability cannot bring about consolidation as well. A democracy must manifest the capability to manage and survive both horizontal and vertical separations of power. The crucial test of the strength of a democratic system lies in the extent of participation it enjoys from all citizens.
In the changed climate, not only is the monarch refusing to democratise willingly but is also trying to destabilise the democratic consolidation process, no matter how resilient the new government. The deferral in prosecution of those indisputably responsible for abuses and appeasing of those opposed to restructuring of the society provide them with ample opportunities for all sorts of provocations. The new democratic setup must be capable of moving quickly to neutralise the base of power of antidemocratic forces. Most important is to ensure a society-centred approach which emphasises the relationship between the regime and the society such that the new mechanism has the capacity to deliver on requirements of law and order and welfare. That would result in great confidence in democratic system, which is the yardstick for its sustainability.
The interim constitution has provided for an all-powerful prime minister. It has made this office the prime centre of all sorts of opportunistic manoeuvrings and self-justifying dictatorial models. Koirala is epitomised as a figure indispensable for democratic consolidation, whereas no one but the people are indispensable in a democracy. It is an irony that Koirala is termed a “democrat”, whereas it is widely believed that he is one of the country’s most corrupt politicians, who has successfully endeavoured to hold onto power by hook or by crook, and
one who makes grandiose promises while in power but seldom delivers on those. Even if it is granted that Koirala is a necessary evil in the present political context, the people must not suffer from a fatal and immutable democratic deficit resulting from the whim of a single person.
Even if we are to believe that the interim government will be an important step towards democratic transition, even then, the power would not rest in the hands of the people. The ruling clique has a range of options at hand; but we have to presume that Nepal is not a political entity defined by rule of the people.
Thapa is professor of Politics, TU
