History will judge whether Trump's businessman's approach to statecraft represents strategic genius or the final chapter of American hegemony
Donald Trump's return to the presidency marks more than a political comeback – it signals a fundamental shift in American grand strategy not seen since the Cold War. Unlike predecessors who relied on military might and institutional leadership, Trump treats foreign policy as a business transaction, positioning himself as perhaps the first truly "economist president" in U.S. history. The question now is whether this economic-centric approach can sustain American hegemony or hasten its decline.
For over seven decades, the US cast itself as the "indispensable nation", ensuring global stability through military alliances, economic integration, and multilateral institutions. That era is ending. Trump's administration has imposed a blanket 10% tariff on all countries, including allies like Canada and Mexico, signalling a shift from benevolent hegemon to what critics call an "extractive superpower."
This is more than protectionism – it's a reimagining of American power. Where past presidents led through example and alliances, Trump leads through leverage. Security guarantees are no longer unconditional but commodities to be negotiated; alliance commitments become bargaining chips in economic disputes.
The implications are staggering. NATO allies face pressure to increase defense spending while managing American tariffs. Indo-Pacific partners like Japan, South Korea, and Australia find themselves navigating between security cooperation and economic competition. Even India, despite the continuing QUAD partnership representing 35% of global GDP, faces tariff pressures that complicate the strategic relationship.
Perhaps, the most audacious element of Trump's strategy is a "reverse Nixon" – seeking to drive a wedge between China and Russia, rather than unite with China against the USSR as in 1972. The logic is clear: if China is the greater long-term threat, why not peel Moscow away from Beijing?
Trump's team believes they can offer Putin a deal superior to anything China can provide, potentially involving sanctions relief, recognition of territorial gains (in Ukraine), or economic partnerships. The goal is to break Russia's alliances with China, Iran, and North Korea, isolating Beijing as the sole adversary while removing the nightmare scenario of a Sino-Russian axis.
This strategy carries enormous risks. Russia and China have spent years building complementary economic and military partnerships precisely because both see the US as their primary threat. Putin's war in Ukraine has only strengthened these bonds, making any American overture appear as an attempt to divide and conquer rather than genuine partnership.
Meanwhile, alternative power centres are consolidating. BRICS expanded in early 2025 to include countries like Indonesia and Nigeria, now representing roughly 55% of the world population and 42% of global GDP. This isn't merely an economic bloc but an emerging parallel system that offers middle powers an alternative to American-dominated institutions.
China has skilfully exploited American alliance tensions, expanding its influence in Europe and the Global South even as it faces American pressure. Beijing presents itself as the defender of multilateralism and free trade-a messaging coup that would have been unthinkable during previous American administrations that championed those same principles.
Trump's economic nationalism rests on a fundamental assumption: that America's market size and technological advantages provide sufficient leverage to dictate terms globally. However, this approach faces three critical limitations. First, it assumes other nations will accept American economic coercion rather than develop alternatives, an assumption challenged by the growth of alternative payment systems, trade relationships, and technological capabilities. Second, it treats allies as adversaries, potentially driving them into the arms of competitors. Third, it abandons the soft power advantages that made American leadership attractive rather than merely tolerable.
India exemplifies these tensions. As the world's most populous democracy and fastest-growing major economy, India represents a crucial test of Trump's strategy. The QUAD partnership continues, demonstrating shared security interests in containing Chinese expansion. Yet 50% tariff pressures strain the relationship, forcing New Delhi to balance between strategic cooperation with Washington and economic pragmatism that may include deeper ties with alternative power centres like China and Russia.
If Trump can maintain strategic cooperation with India despite economic tensions, it suggests his transactional approach can work. If India drifts toward BRICS-style alternatives, it indicates the fundamental limits of economic coercion as a grand strategy.
Trump's approach represents neither traditional isolationism nor conventional internationalism, but something entirely new: selective engagement based on economic leverage rather than institutional leadership. This strategy could restore American advantages by forcing other nations to compete for American favour rather than taking it for granted.
Alternatively, it could accelerate the emergence of a genuinely multipolar world where American leadership becomes increasingly irrelevant. The success of wedging China and Russia remains highly uncertain, while the costs of alliance fracturing are immediate and measurable.
The Trump Doctrine is a high-stakes gamble that economic nationalism can replace the institutional frameworks that upheld U.S. global leadership for decades. Its outcome could redefine America's role in the world and reshape the global order for generations
History will judge whether Trump's businessman's approach to statecraft represents strategic genius or the final chapter of American hegemony. The early returns suggest the outcome remains very much in doubt.
Basnyat, a Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, is a strategic analyst, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand
