Bennett Ramberg

If Pyongyang eliminates its plutonium production enterprise, as it promised in exchange for being removed from the US State Department’s terrorism-sponsor list, it will be one for the history books. It also will be the Bush administration’s crowning foreign-policy achievement, but at a price. Kim Jong beat President Bush at the nuclear game: He built, tested, and kept the bomb. The North never disassociated security and political leverage with nuclear weapons

elimination as did South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Libya. On top of that, the Stalinist regime’s persistent backsliding gave clues to the difficulty US diplomats would face in attempting to get Pyongyang to abide by its 2005 denuclearisation declaration.

Now North Korea’s requirement that only “mutual agreement” will permit inspection of suspect

atomic sites suggests that little nuclear disarmament beyond identified nuclear sites is in the offing. Left with this kind of legacy, the Obama administration has a hefty challenge ahead. That doesn’t mean, of course, that it should stop the six-party and bilateral talks. Clearly such meetings can hold Kim’s feet to the fire to honour his new responsibilities. So, with the agreement in hand, Obama must pursue a new, bolder diplomatic approach in order to warm ties and cool nuclear ambitions. His administration should start with a simple step: an unconditional offer to exchange ambassadors.

Also, the opening of embassies will permit better communication and allow Washington’s diplomats to better decipher the North and thus improve policymaking. Economic ties offer a second track. Current agreements allow the North to receive economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance. Heavy oil shipments and food have followed. But Washington should do more. Without precondition, it should throw open the doors to American investment in the North. Given the country’s isolation, economic openings would expose the North Korean population to the promise of a better life. True, it may buttress the regime in the short run, but will undermine it in the long.

Military confidence-building must be a component for a more secure Korean Peninsula.

Then there remains one line the US cannot allow Pyongyang to cross: the exporting of nuclear

weapons, weapons material, or technology. Washington must tell North Korea clearly that if it contributes any nuclear item that results in a nuclear weapons incident, the US will take steps to ensure the regime’s prompt demise.

Of course, all of this will not magically eliminate North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. But neither will strategies of continued nuclear negotiation, confrontation, or, given the apparent resilience of the regime, isolation.

Expanded engagement accepts the reality of the world as we find it, while offering a subtle but practical means to change it. Given time and commitment, the policy can work to undermine the political foundation that sustains the Stalinist regime.