US and coalition forces scored a major victory with the elimination of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Al Qaeda’s leader in Iraq. But the insurgents quickly retaliated by killing three US soldiers. And Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s No. 2, came out with a new videotape lauding Zarqawi’s martyrdom.

Zarqawi’s death raises the question: How is the US performing in the war in Iraq; and, maybe more significantly, in the larger global war on terror (GWOT)?

One might assume that a positive outcome in the war in Iraq brings about a corollary result in the GWOT. But this view is an overly simplified measurement of our success. Both counter-terror and counter-insurgent effectiveness are difficult to gauge. A number of metrics, such as body counts, group longevity, or estimates of the group’s size or influence can indicate success in both types of conflict. But understanding the ultimate goals of winning each conflict dictates how we judge the efforts in combating them more precisely.

For example, in Iraq, is getting the US troops home or leaving the country capable of defending and policing itself while developing a democratic government the real measure of victory? And in the GWOT, is the real goal to wipe out all terrorism, or are we actually trying to mitigate the impact on our nation? One of the most often used methods for scoring success in Iraq has been the use of body counts. Coalition forces in Iraq herald the numbers of insurgents killed or point to the killing of Zarqawi to bolster their position. On the other side, though, are the growing numbers of US troop casualties — now more than 2,500 killed.

Ultimately, body counts are an inaccurate measurement of effectiveness in conflicts. Another metric is more helpful in scoring the war in Iraq. The increasing competence of Iraqi internal security is paramount to Coalition and Iraqi success. Estimates suggest between 110,000 and 135,000 Iraqi internal security forces are now equipped, trained, and operating in Iraq. Related is the question of whether these security forces are able to deny insurgent control of geographic areas.

However, the success with internal security in Iraq has no corollary impact in the broader GWOT. A realistic measure of our triumphs in the GWOT is the reduction of terrorist attacks, both in frequency and intensity. Since 9/11, the efforts of the US government have to be judged as successful by the lack of domestic attacks. Moreover, the terror attacks that have occurred, take London and Madrid for example, are less intense or lethal.

If we judge our success or failure by our efforts in mitigating attacks against the US, then we’ve been successful. But if the goal is to eradicate terrorism — then it isn’t just about preventing crime, it is about changing the world’s outlook, which requires diplomatic, economic, and social actions in addition to security efforts. If we judge our success against the president’s stated goal, our progress in the GWOT has to be seen as less effective than efforts here at home. — The Christian Science Monitor