The degree to which the suggestions put forward by the Auditor General will be enforced remains to be seen. However, going by past history, it is far-fetched that even an iota of the recommendations will be executed

In the past several years, the subject of corruption—the exploitation of public office for personal accretion—has been the theme for confabulation among academicians and planners. An array of reasons can be advanced as to why this issue has come under renewed inspection. Corruption scandals have dislodged governments in many developed as well as developing countries, including the least-developed ones. In the transition countries, the switch from command economies to free market economies has led to Brobdingnagian scopes for appropriation of rents (that is, exorbitant profits).

Corruption is most extensive where other configurations of institutional inefficiency, such as political instability, bureaucratic red tape, and weak, legislative and judicial systems prevail. It is far-reaching in countries such as Nepal not because the people are different from people elsewhere but because situations are ripe for it. Not only are opportunities to engage in corruption copious, the inducement to procure income is extremely potent, exacerbated by poverty and by appalling civil service remuneration.

Additionally, risks of all ilk (for instance, illness and unemployment) are precipitous, and people broadly lack the numerous risk-spreading instruments available in more opulent countries. The discretion of many public officials is also broad, and this systemic weakness is exacerbated by poorly expounded, ever changing, and deficiently propagated rules and regulations.

There are different kinds of corruption which encompass, inter alia, bribery, extortion, nepotism, fraud, the use of ‘speed money’ (money furnished to government officials to quicken their consideration of business matter falling within their jurisdiction), and embezzlement. Although people consider corruption as a sin of government, it is also rife in the private sector.

Corruption could also be assumed to mitigate growth by lessening the quality of public infrastructure and service, decreasing tax receipt, inducing talented people to involve in rent-seeking rather than fruitful occupations, and distorting the mix of government consumption.

If the expenses of corruption are steep, why don’t governments get rid of it? A probable rejoinder is that once a corrupt mode prevails, and a majority of people function within that system, people have no impetus to try to alter it or prevent taking part in it, even if everyone would be better off if graft were to be stamped out.

Empirical research has proven that countries that are politically more corrupt tend to be more politically unstable. Furthermore, it has been manifested that both corruption and political volatility may emanate from the collapse of members of the same government or ruling elite. Researchers have begun to vet the nexus between civil servants’ salaries and the extent of corruption and have proposed that equitable salaries are a necessary condition for eschewing corruption, though not a sufficient one.

Certain strident measures could be executed to truncate the degree of corruption. First, the major culprits must be penalized. When there is a culture of indulging in corrupt acts with impunity, one technique is for a number of major corrupt characters to be sentenced and penalized. In this framework, the government should expeditiously pinpoint a few major tax evaders, a few big bribe givers, and a few high-level government bribe takers.

Second, the whole population must be consulted in analyzing corrupt methods. Modes of consulting them encompass undertaking systematic client surveys, involving professional institutions, and educational programs.

Third, there is a demand to reconstruct incentives. In Nepal, the public sector wages are so low that a family cannot survive on a typical Section Officer’s salaries. Likewise, degrees of propitious outcomes are often not present in the public sector, so that what officials earn is not linked with what they spawn.

Political bigwigs in Nepal have made politics a gadget for garnering wealth illicitly. It is preposterous to tackle corruption where a capable and artless political leadership does not exist.

Accountability is also extremely fragile. Laws and principles of ethics in government have not been aptly promoted, and the legal organizations charged with administering them are not fully prepared for this intricate task.

This year’s annual report of the Auditor General (AG), though a preachy, goody-goody document, has revealed far-reaching instances of corruption and underscores the requirement for transparency to tackle the anomalies. The degree to which the suggestions put forward by the AG will be enforced remains to be seen. However, going by past history, it is far-fetched that even an iota of the recommendations will be executed.

To conclude, corruption is a symptom of fundamental economic, political and institutional causes. Addressing corruption efficiently entails tackling these latent causes. Contesting it starts with the blueprint of better structures. Monopolies must be either curtailed or gingerly regulated. Official discretion must be elucidated.

Transparency must be reinforced. In other words, an economic approach is required coupled with great political sensitivity. However, as long as the political system does not possess strong moral convictions, corrupt habits will continue to prevail.