Our multiparty democracy is indeed vibrant. Despite numerous flaws, the system allows people to participate in the political process, elect representatives, and express grievances. Consequently, each election cycle marks a political reset with profound implications. Yet people rarely recognise that it is also an economic event with deep impacts on public finances, resource allocation, and economic growth prospects. According to the Nepal Economic Forum, elections in Nepal are reportedly 147 times more expensive than in India. It is, therefore, high time to make elections more sustainable in Nepal. Let us examine the recent election costs more closely. In the 2074 general election, costs were estimated at around Rs 16.26 billion. The last parliamentary election in 2079 had a budget of approximately Rs 18.5 billion. The upcoming general election scheduled for this month is projected to cost approximately Rs 31 billion (US$ 211 million). The substantial increase in costs is partly due to this election's unplanned nature. Surprisingly, these figures do not account for the ever-increasing personal expenses incurred by candidates during the election campaign. This includes unconfirmed reports of shady political deals involving the payment of a lump sum to secure party nomination tickets, including those for proportional candidates. Undoubtedly, total government expenditures and individual candidates' election-related expenses are staggering; however, their impact on the national economy is often overlooked. When a large share of public and private funds is allocated to elections every few years, difficult trade-offs in development spending inevitably follow. In the short term, election spending injects money into parts of the economy, generating a modest uptick in activity in the services and transportation sectors. But these gains are rarely transformative. Most of the electoral budget goes to administrative or procedural activities, such as printing ballots, deploying security forces, training poll workers, and running voter education campaigns. There is little capital investment that could yield productivity gains or long-term economic benefits unless the election outcome results in a stable and efficient government, which has not been the case in the past. Nepal's fiscal space is limited. The government often operates with tight tax revenue, as national debt levels rise and repayment obligations consume public revenue. In such an environment, frequent elections create recurrent budgetary cycles that disrupt multi-year fiscal planning. Earmarking tens of billions of rupees to elections every few years means that fiscal authorities must tighten belts elsewhere or borrow more to fill gaps. Over the long run, habitual election spending becomes embedded in the political economy. As mentioned earlier, Nepali elections are costly for both the state and the candidates. Independent analyses of past elections reveal a striking trend. In the 2074 electoral cycle, for example, it is estimated that a total of Rs 13.1 billion were spent across local, provincial, and federal elections, with candidates and their networks spending more money than the government itself. The numbers were substantially higher in 2079 and are expected to be even higher in this election. This paints a troubling picture: when candidates and parties spend vast sums that are often beyond legal ceilings, the incentive to recoup investment through rent-seeking, lobbying, or patronage becomes strong. This can distort public policy once leaders are elected, skewing priorities toward narrow personal interests rather than public economic welfare. Such dynamics erode the quality of governance and encourage deep corruption. Government allocations, measured in billions of rupees, and private spending, measured in tens of billions, indicate that elections are more than a civic democratic exercise. They are major economic events that absorb scarce resources and divert funds from productive investments. With GDP growth struggling, heavy dependence on remittances, and limited public revenues, the opportunity cost of election spending is simply too high in Nepal's case. The solution is not to undermine democracy. However, election economics requires urgent reform. Future elections must be well planned and better managed, with fiscal discipline as a focus. First, cost-control mechanisms must be strengthened. Strict enforcement of campaign expenditure laws, transparent reporting, and independent audits can help curb the race to inflate costs. Public financing mechanisms, in which the state subsidises campaign expenses in a regulated manner, might reduce pressure on private spending. Second, administrative reforms can streamline election logistics. Investing in efficient voter registration systems, digital outreach, and cost-effective polling procedures can reduce procedural costs without compromising electoral integrity. Third, political stability matters. Frequent parliamentary dissolutions and the formation of interim governments increase the number of elections. A stronger commitment to political consensus on term stability could reduce unnecessary electoral cycles and the economic burden they entail. Fourth, voters also have a responsibility. In reality, people have consistently re-elected the same failed leadership over and over. Voters must exercise their independent consciences at the polling station. Finally, the constitution is partly to blame because it is designed to make a single-party majority government nearly impossible. The choice after each election remains the same: a coalition government led by the same political cartels. This is severely undermining the rationale for holding elections, both theoretically and practically. How do we guarantee that it will be different this time? Elections are, and must remain, central to Nepal's democratic identity. But understanding their economic footprint is critical. The billions spent, the diverted resources, and the corruption incentives created by the candidate's inflated expenditures cannot go unnoticed. Therefore, election economics should not be an afterthought; it must be part of the broader national dialogue on good governance, public finance, and national development. Dr Paudel is a financial economist