The sweeping victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the return of Tarique Rahman after 17 years in exile mark the most consequential political transition since the 2024 uprising that ousted Sheikh Hasina. For the first time in nearly two decades, Bangladesh stands at the threshold of a genuine reset. Yet elections resolve leadership questions; they do not resolve structural fragility. Stability will not be secured by victory alone. It will be earned through economic relief, institutional restraint, and tangible improvements in daily life. The BNP's commanding majority reflects both fatigue with prolonged turmoil and a public demand for governability. A simultaneous constitutional referendum reinforced that mandate, signalling appetite for institutional reform and limits on executive overreach. Yet the political terrain remains delicate. The Awami League was barred from participation. The Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami secured its strongest-ever parliamentary presence, emerging as the principal opposition. The student-led National Citizen Party (NCP), which helped ignite the 2024 uprising, has been reduced to a marginal force. This is not a settled system. It is a recalibrating one. Bangladesh's new parliament is also unusually fresh: more than two-thirds of lawmakers are first-time members, many drawn from business backgrounds. Renewal creates opportunity But renewal without inclusion risks volatility. Limited representation of women and minorities, combined with the exclusion of major political actors, could embed a politics of grievances beneath the surface of parliamentary arithmetic. Democratic consolidation requires competitive pluralism, not managed equilibrium. If this transition is to mark a turning point rather than a pause in confrontation, four priorities demand urgent attention. First is Law and Order Without Retribution. Rahman has pledged peace, unity, and rule of law. The credibility of that pledge will be measured in conduct, not rhetoric. Bangladesh has endured political killings, mob violence, institutional politicisation, and erosion of public trust. Professional, even-handed security conduct - coupled with visible accountability - will determine whether post-election tensions dissipate or escalate. Second is Cost-of-Living Relief as Stabilistion Policy. Inflation, currency pressure, unemployment, and declining reserves have shortened public patience. Targeted economic relief, improved fiscal discipline, and measures to restore investor confidence will stabilise the country more effectively than celebratory declarations. Youth employment - in a nation where a third of the population is under 35 - will be decisive. Third is Institutional Repair. Years of polarisation hollowed out trust in courts, civil administration, security services, and regulatory bodies. Rebuilding institutional neutrality is slow, technical work - but it is foundational. Governance capacity, not political messaging, will determine whether disputes are resolved in courtrooms or on streets. Lastly, Inclusion as Risk Management. Minority protections, women's participation, and political space for opposition voices are early indicators of whether polarisation is being reduced or entrenched. Foreign policy will test whether Bangladesh's internal reset translates into regional recalibration. Senior BNP figures have called for a 'reset and recalibration' with India. Relations with New Delhi became personalized under Hasina's long tenure, creating perceptions - fair or not - of asymmetry and overdependence. Both sides appear open to pragmatic engagement. But unresolved issues remain: water sharing, trade imbalances, border management, connectivity corridors, and development financing. A durable reset will require insulating economic cooperation from political turbulence. Rahman's 'Bangladesh First' doctrine signals strategic autonomy rather than alignment politics. Dhaka will likely balance ties among India, China, the United States, and regional partners, while reviving multilateral frameworks such as SAARC and BIMSTEC. In a region shaped increasingly by US-China competition, Bangladesh's strategic geography gives it leverage but also exposure. For Washington, South Asia is no longer viewed solely through a counterterrorism lens but through the broader prism of competition with China and the management of regional balances. The US continues to rely on Pakistan for selective counterterrorism cooperation and regional access, even as it deepens its strategic partnership with India to offset China's rise. Bangladesh sits within this triangular geometry. As Beijing expands its footprint through infrastructure financing and maritime connectivity under the Belt and Road framework, Washington has an interest in ensuring Dhaka retains strategic autonomy rather than drifting into overdependence on China. For the US, a stable, economically resilient Bangladesh reduces the space for Chinese leverage, prevents further regional polarisation, and supports a multipolar South Asia where no single external power dominates the Bay of Bengal. The strong parliamentary showing of Jamaat-e-Islami reflects another structural reality: ideological politics has not receded. Managing ideological tension without amplifying it will demand political maturity to ensure that democratic competition does not erode constitutional safeguards. Bangladesh is not a peripheral state. It is a major UN peacekeeping contributor, a central node in global apparel supply chains, host to nearly one million Rohingya refugees, and positioned along sea lanes through which much of the world's energy and container trade flows. Instability in Dhaka radiates outward: supply-chain disruption, migration pressure, security spillovers, and strategic recalculations across South Asia. A stable Bangladesh strengthens regional integration. For external partners - whether India, the US, China, or multilateral institutions - the priority should not be partisan alignment but institutional strengthening: economic resilience, accountable governance, and inclusive political space. The BNP inherits a nation exhausted by confrontation yet hopeful for renewal. If the new government governs with restraint, restores economic confidence, protects pluralism, and repairs institutions, Bangladesh could move towards a more durable equilibrium - one shaped by delivery rather than dominance. If not, electoral victory may become merely the prelude to another cycle of instability. Basnyat is Maj. Gen. (Retd.) and a strategic affairs analyst based in Kathmandu