Opinion

Who owns the peace process?

Who owns the peace process?

By Ajaya Bhadra Khanal

Prachanda thought he had completely won over the populace with his honesty and charm before the tape arrived. Despite his clarifications in a crowded press conference two days after his resignation, Prachanda has not been able to undo the damage the tape had inflicted on the Nepali psyche. As debates on the issue continue to simmer, it has become obvious that the peace process has taken a back seat. Rues Daman Nath Dhungana, former speaker of the parliament and a constitution drafter in 1990, “There is nobody to own the peace process.” That theme is immensely powerful. The whole issue is about politicians fighting for power in an already over-politicized society. It has become obvious that the Nepali Congress feels completely betrayed, and the UNMIN has been dragged into the controversy. It’s nothing new for the UNMIN, because NC President Girija Prasad Koirala and others have always portrayed it as always favouring the Maoists. These politicians continue to claim that the Maoists used the UNMIN to hoodwink the international community, and disguise their totalitarian intent. A key reason for the President’s decisions--asking Katawal to hold fort, and recommending the government to review its decisions--was a concern for security, and a fear that the integrity of the Nepali Army might be compromised. That threat, according to Presidential aides, came about because General Kul Bahadur Khadka, the number two, was unable to take charge. What is hidden here is the fact that CoAS Katawal told the PSOs that the President was going to review the orders, and giving charge to Khadka would be premature. What is also hidden is the fact that the President feared that Nepali Army might be involved in something that would put the lives of many people at risk. Whether the Nepali Army might have done something like that would be speculation, but what is real is the President’s informed perception that something like that was a possibility. The President is not regretting his decision, because he is still convinced that the pointers he was raising have a constitutional validity. He is concerned, at the personal level, because the whole episode hovers around political differences that are threatening the peace process and the constitution writing process. Presidential aides said he intended his move as a temporary measure and not a “permanent solution.” The President’s move is still controversial in that the Maoists and the MJF, two of the four largest parties have officially criticized it, and the CPN-UML is sharply divided. This division is unfortunate, as is the Presidential orders asking CoAS Katawal to stay put. The whole controversy unfortunately hovers around the institutions of the President and the Nepali Army. We could have done without them. Clearly, Prime Minister Prachanda’s handling of the issues of national importance had been generating a lot of criticism. While the Maoists were intent on excluding the other political parties, the other political parties, in turn, seem to be intent on excluding the Maoists. What the tapes revealed were that the Maoists, 14 months after signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement were intent on embezzling state resources to “fund” a proletarian revolution, Maoizing the Nepali Army and other state institutions, and hoodwinking the democrats and the international community. It indicated the leadership’s disregard for peace commitments and the responsibility to explain their position to the party workers. Despite this controversial political brinkmanship, we must forge a path ahead. In doing so, we must recognize certain realities. First, whether we like it or not, the UCPN-Maoist continues to be the largest party in the parliament with 40 per cent seats. It reflects a substantial amount of public support. While that number may not necessarily give legitimacy to the Maoists to rule with an iron fist, it does make the Maoists the most powerful players in the constitution drafting process. Secondly, the political parties must own Nepal’s peace process. And there is no other way than working together. Maoists’ active participation is necessary to drive the peace process (integration of Maoist combatants and delivery of transitional justice), draft a new constitution and restructure the state. Already the Maoists have declared non-cooperation if the government’s decision to sack Katawal is not implemented and the Presidential orders to retain CoAS Katawal is not reversed. Given the political balance, the current row is likely to hold hostage the peace process. Nepal must forge a new political understanding in order to move the political process forward. Commonalities, including people’s interests, must be brought to the forefront of any political dialogue. The best place to sort out differences is the parliament, and if the Maoists are really serious, they should have the courage to present their case to the parliament instead of taking it to the streets. We know that the Maoists understand the language of the street better than the language of the parliament, but at least, it will demonstrate that they are serious about taking the peace process to its logical conclusion.