New Delhi, April 24
This week marks one year since the Pahalgam terrorist attack. On April 22, 2025, gunmen entered a meadow near Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir and carried out a calculated assault on civilians-designed as much to terrorize as to kill.
Among the 26 victims was a young Nepali, Sudeep Neupane. This was not indiscriminate violence. The attackers moved through a crowded tourist area, separated men from their families, asked their religion, and in some cases forced them to recite Islamic declarations. Those who failed were shot at close range, often in front of their wives and children. The intent was clear: to send a message far beyond the meadow.
This was identity-based killing aimed at reshaping perception. Tourism had come to symbolize a fragile return to normalcy in Jammu and Kashmir-families traveling, markets active, movement unhindered. By targeting tourists and emphasizing religious identity, the attackers sought to fracture that image and reinsert fear into everyday life. Such tactics are typical of proxy conflicts, where violence is used not just to inflict casualties but to erode confidence and alter political conditions.
Responsibility was claimed by The Resistance Front (TRF), widely seen as a front for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Pakistan-based group designated a global terrorist organization by the United States in 2001. TRF emerged in 2019 after India revoked Article 370, which had granted special status to Jammu and Kashmir.
LeT's history-including the 2008 Mumbai attacks-demonstrates its ability to conduct complex, high-impact operations. Front groups like TRF provide deniability while preserving the same leadership, training, and operational networks.
This structure has long defined the Kashmir conflict. Militant groups operate at arm's length, advancing strategic objectives while allowing plausible deniability. Incidents like Pahalgam are not isolated-they are part of a sustained campaign using calibrated violence to impose costs without triggering full-scale war. The system is designed to endure.
India's response reflected a more assertive doctrine. Beyond diplomatic protest, it moved across multiple fronts. It suspended key aspects of engagement with Pakistan under the Indus Waters Treaty, signaling that even longstanding agreements are contingent on security behavior.
Militarily, India launched Operation Sindoor-and carried out precision strikes on nine terrorist-linked sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, targeting infrastructure used for planning, training and attacks. Over four days, the exchange followed a cycle of escalation and counter-escalation, with India maintaining the initiative until a ceasefire was reached.
This marked an evolution in India's strategy. Earlier responses after Uri (2016) and Pulwama (2019) broke from restraint but remained limited. Operation Sindoor went further-combining military and non-military tools to send a clearer signal: major attacks will invite broader, more integrated retaliation aimed at reshaping expectations.
Even after Operation Sindoor, infiltration attempts, explosives recoveries, and disrupted plots continued. In November 2025, a car bomb near Delhi's Red Fort killed over a dozen people-part of the same broader pattern of cross-border terrorism.
Pahalgam, then, is not just a memory but a case study. It reveals a system of proxy violence that remains active, a strategic response that is evolving, and a conflict that is far from resolved. Remembering it requires more than recounting the horror-it demands confronting the structures that sustain such attacks and the long-term effort needed to dismantle them.
For Nepal, the lessons are not abstract. From the IC 814 hijacking in 1999 to the killing of a Nepali citizen in Pahalgam, the risks are real. The need for a coherent, forward-looking counterterrorism policy is no longer optional-it is overdue.
Raakhee J Mehta is a Delhi-based research scholar