Democratic-regime building in Nepal: Moving beyond tokenism?

Totalitarianism differs from forms of authoritarian rule found in the non-communist world; so the post-communist Eastern Europe faced difficulties while functioning democratically despite “the end of history”; the step-by-step changeover of power took a number of forms to keep the balance between the old and the new elites in power. On the other hand, Nepal’s constraints are structural that requires stimulated participation along democratic lines so that the common patterns of political behavior become strengthened. The little advancement in strengthening of democracy does deserve recognition, but the people have become desperate

due to thuggery and selfishness all around with which, paradoxically, the political and economic system is being developed.

It is often presumed that democratic development is an accidental process, whereas power relations never remain static. Clear-cut rules of the game can prevent clashes that undermine democracy, more so in times of crises. Nepal’s still being a weak polity, the transition cannot be completed unless rival political forces commit themselves credibly to contest for power, without fear of existence or privileges, by establishing a reliable mechanism what Dahl (2006) calls ‘mutual security’ which facilitates interactions that function as threshold of liberal democracy along with mediating efforts to resolve conflicts so that democracy becomes accessible, accountable and representative.

Constitution is, among other things, a compact compromise among political parties. Yet, the common element seems to be a lack of ideological fixity and a desire to try new remedies to address the ailments and other factors that are important but difficult to measure, fostering greater political competition to achieve better political, governmental and legal institutions, and what this tells us about the current paucity of democracy that whatever is responsible for the current weakness of liberalism has led to a revaluation of democracy, albeit, democracy does not fit in the situation or in the context. Nepal has turned over a new leaf twenty years after soliciting whether the transition has succeeded in reconstructing an inclusive and democratic sense of political community in the context of fundamental changes in the level of economic and constitutional reforms to construct a dynamic country committed to the values for freedom, justice, equality and solidarity; something that have not been accomplished, but another phase, no less dangerous and insidious has begun. Even then, we are not speaking of procedure, content, or result which are confined to political institutions and observed in regard to quality of democracy as a success story and that, under some circumstances at least, values, culture, beliefs, ideology and legitimacy: they are clearly too fundamental and have a significant relationship and a preponderant influence for the practice of representative democracy.

Up to a point, the best institutions are of little use in the absence of strategic political leadership, but then democratic consolidation is a process that hinges on widening public sphere as core priority for the building of an innovative nation, one that creates such opportunities for entrepreneurial people, economic success, racial harmony, and political stability that diminish the chances of adverse reversal. A critical factor that hinders Nepal’s democratic development as well as trust in governance is embedded within the parties that rely on personal attacks, negative advertising and throwaway promises for power.

Drawing on the recent experience involving political liberalization and restructuring, we can see that domestic factors explain only how smooth or difficult a transition could be. Yet, we can understand the dogmatic responses of the Madhav Nepal-led regime, which is seen as replica of Panchayat-style regime, and that this might be seen as transition to a new non democratic regime, to quote Linz in light of recent political developments, which continues to raise both constitutional and political problems, piling on fresh evidence that political accountability, democratic control, and a nation built in a deliberate way is a fiction. We can again see the chaos of politics under the current regime compounded with fostering avenue of political opposition’s manipulating and discursive practices largely counteracted by the acute pseudo or false state-and nation-building that would make a case for a hollow democracy and plutocratic participation and representation.

After all, those 601 not long ago had promised everything to get votes, but are now doing no work, developing as a case of political stagnation that does not give a Nepali reason to hope to exercise and to engage in the country’s institutional politics and liberalization of the political process. If a larger percentage of people consider themselves alienated or do not want to be a part of a political entity or endeavor and quite a number of well off people merely see the negative dimensions of performances around the regime, the resultant dismal prospect for democracy may be likened to Achilles’ heel, let alone any democratic consolidation.

Thapa is Professor of Politics, TU