Charles Harb

The upheaval in Beirut is better understood as a power play by vested interests than a democratic revolution .

Do events in Lebanon reflect a population united in rejecting Syrian influence, and is this “independence uprising’’ part of an inexorable movement towards freedom and democracy? Popular discontent was already apparent last September when a Syrian-orchestrated constitutional amendment extended President Emile Lahoud’s mandate. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt joined the various Christian opposition groups, creating a Christian-Druze alliance in defiance of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. The Sunni leader and former prime minister, Rafik al-Hariri, was seen as tacitly, if not enthusiastically, supporting the opposition.

Hariri’s assassination last month then became a dramatically polarising event, and the catalyst for a popular upheaval against Syrian forces. Two weeks after the assassination, and at the behest of the financial lobbies of Beirut, the opposition called a rally - and thousands of young Lebanese defied a government ban to take to the streets. The government resigned and the international media had a field day. The wind of change and hope, from Iraq to Palestine, was blowing in Lebanon.

This rosy picture fails to take into account the socio-political structures of Lebanese society. Its governance is built on a sectarian and feudal consensual system. It is an aggregate of religious minority groups that coalesce around local feudal lords in return for services. Each sect is given a clear share of power. For example, the president of the country has to be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the head of parliament a Shia Muslim. Governance tends to be built on consensus between the various parties. When major differences between the factions emerge, the country is thrown into crisis. And when external players get involved, crisis has the potential to turn into civil war. That was the case first in 1952, again in 1958 and 1969, culminating in the 15-year civil war between 1975 and 1990.

It may be that the current situation is no different. With increasing economic problems, friction between the parties was already growing. The geopolitical earthquake triggered by the war on Iraq was tightening the security noose in Lebanon. By endorsing the unifying effect of Hariri’s death on the wider Lebanese population, opposition leaders appeared to represent a drive towards freedom and the US project for “the greater Middle East”.

However, four internal factors need to be considered. First, the Shias, one of the largest segments of the Lebanese population, have not joined the opposition. Although there is antipathy towards Syrian hegemony, “Lebanon” is not united behind current developments.

Second, some of the leaders of this “insurrection” are power players who held no grievance towards Syrian tutelage while they profited from it. Many of those promoting this free and democratic revolution are the same autocratic warlords who tore the country apart 15 years ago and have been undemocratically jousting for power ever since.

Third, the opposition has not offered any programme of reform of corrupt institutions or platform for a new beginning. Fourth, freedom of expression and democratic practices were not suddenly born with Hariri’s assassination. Lebanon’s media is one of the freest in the Middle East, and its consensual democratic system has been in place for decades.

If we assume that elections are held in May, the same non-transparent, corrupt and clientele governance is likely to endure - with Syria’s monopoly redistributed to include a wider American and French influence.

Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt see an opportunity to enhance their regional role at the expense of Syria’s. The US sees the events as an opportunity to further pressure Syria - whose help it needs to pacify Iraq - to toe its line. Bogged down in Iraq, the US does not yet seem to want regime change in Syria. US interests lie in a docile Syrian regime. And if the US neocons harbour designs against Iran, then securing the northern Israeli border by neutralising Hizbullah is a must. Arab sensitivities are also at play. With an Alawi minority ruling the Sunni majority in Syria, Hariri’s assassination is widely perceived as part of a plot to shrink Sunni influences (from Iraq to Syria and Lebanon), and is fuelling Sunni-centrism in the area.

Syrian mismanagement of the Lebanese portfolio had been building up to a critical mass that only needed a detonator to explode. Neither the Iraqi elections nor Bush’s phenomenal use of the word “freedom” led to the dramatic events in Lebanon. The assassination was not only the spark, but also the main motor behind the demonstrations. Current developments must be seen in the light of opportunistic exploitation by local, regional and international players rather than as a “democratic revolution”.

Last Tuesday’s powerful counter-demonstration by government loyalists, especially Hizbullah, should rein in international euphoria. Beirut had never seen a crowd so large. Hizbullah’s charismatic leader, Hassan Nasrallah, addressed a crowd of a million people, and reminded the world that “Lebanon is not Ukraine”. Recent events do spur a glimmer of hope for positive, non-violent change. But if local and regional players want to see a Lebanon enjoying its “sovereignty, freedom and independence”, then they need to take the complexity of social reality into account. —The Guardian