Shah has a mandate, energy, and public support. But his domestic record shows institutional strain and a governing style that risks overreach. Balendra Shah has miles to go, and promises to keep

Balendra "Balen" Shah's first six months in office have been marked by a steady consolidation of authority, contraction of cabinet space, and a governing style that increasingly sidelines institutional norms. His rise was unconventional and his mandate emphatic, but his methods now raise structural concerns that touch the core of Nepal's parliamentary functioning.

Shah entered national politics as an outsider, embraced by Gen G voters as a break from the old order. Expectations were high. The first months have shown the limits of charisma when confronted with statecraft, and the limits of unilateralism when confronted with parliamentary architecture.

The anti-corruption drive began immediately. Arrests followed. Investigations were reopened. Labour Minister Deepak Kumar Shah was dismissed; Home Minister Sudhan Gurung resigned after being publicly slighted. The actions were forceful but selective, unsettling the bureaucracy. Critics saw vengeance; supporters saw resolve. Institutional unease grew as officials became uncertain whether decisions were driven by process or impulse.

A more serious trend has emerged. Power has moved inward. Shah has taken personal control of Defence, Industry, Commerce and Supplies, and Labour – core ministries meant to be dispersed in a parliamentary system to ensure collective responsibility. Under Shah, they are held by one office. The PMO has become the centre of executive movement. Ministers complain that files bypass them, decisions arrive fully formed, and policy announcements are made without consultation.

The cabinet has been reduced to a formality, with deliberation thinning and autonomy contracting. Opposition parties and constitutional analysts see a clear deflection of parliamentary accountability. The PMO issues directives that normally originate in ministries. Oversight mechanisms weaken. The governing structure increasingly resembles command rather than consultation. The prime minister must grasp that the PMO cannot become the cabinet, nor the cabinet collapse into an audience.

The style is severe. Zero tolerance on corruption is desirable, and speed necessary, but neither justifies bypassing institutional checks. Efficiency cannot replace accountability; centralisation cannot substitute for process. The risks are structural, not personal, and they accumulate quietly.

The Bhotekoshi-Koshi flood tested Shah more directly than any controversy. The disaster caused significant loss of life and widespread devastation. Shah moved quickly to reach affected zones, but the response machinery showed strain. Coordination between federal, provincial and local units was uneven. Relief distribution was slow in several pockets. The PMO issued directives directly to district officials, bypassing line ministries, which accelerated some actions but also created confusion about chains of command.

The scale of damage exposed the limits of centralised decision-making in a crisis requiring broad institutional mobilisation. Shah's insistence on personal oversight ensured visibility but not coherence, revealing gaps in preparedness, interagency coordination and long-term resilience planning. The episode demonstrated that centralisation may deliver speed, but it does not automatically deliver capacity.

The confrontation with private financial institutions further exposed these limits. Shah ordered banks to transfer frozen and dormant funds into the government treasury. The directive was abrupt, and legal clarity thin. Banks resisted. Lending tightened. Large loans stalled. Industrialists complained. Economists warned of contraction. Investor confidence weakened. The episode showed a government willing to act quickly but not always lawfully, and it demonstrated the consequences of unilateral decisions in a fragile economy that depends on predictable regulatory behaviour.

Diplomacy has not been immune. Shah refused to meet the visiting Indian Foreign Secretary on grounds of "equistature," breaking longstanding practice. The gesture signalled assertion; it also signalled miscalculation. Nepali prime ministers have routinely met senior Indian officials regardless of rank, recognising the practical realities of Nepal-India engagement. Shah's refusal was interpreted in New Delhi as avoidable rigidity rather than principled protocol. He has not visited India or China since taking office, another departure from tradition. The silence is deliberate; it is also costly, because early outreach forms the basis of Nepal's external stability.

His first international appearance at the United Nations General Assembly made one point unmistakable: Balen Shah does not conform. The attire was unconventional; the speech brief and clinical. He demanded climate justice and proposed a Himalayan Climate Resilience Mechanism.

At home, reconstruction is slow, investor confidence weak, employment stagnant. Six months reveal governing habits: forceful, centralised, impatient with procedure and intolerant of dissent. Effective in moments, destabilising in others. The promise of his leadership lies in confronting entrenched interests; the danger lies in bypassing institutions. Reform requires discipline and restraint. Concentration of power cannot become the norm.

Shah has a mandate, energy, and public support. But his domestic record shows institutional strain and a governing style that risks overreach. Balendra Shah has miles to go, and promises to keep.

The author is a veteran of the 4th Gorkha Rifles of the Indian Army and an analyst on public policy, geopolitics, and strategic affairs. Views are personal