The Foreign Minister's visits to India and China show why Nepal needs a public follow-up matrix for every major diplomatic engagement
Courtesy may open diplomatic doors, and protocol may preserve the dignity of the state, but neither is enough to protect Nepal's national interest. Foreign Minister Shisir Khanal's visits to India and China should therefore not be judged only by who received him, how warmly he was welcomed, or what statements were issued. They should be judged by what Nepal prepared before departure, what it placed on the table, and what it followed up after return.
The visits came as the new Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP)-led government was trying to define its foreign-policy style, reassure both neighbours, and move beyond early diplomatic controversies. The question is not whether the visits were necessary. They were. The more important question is whether Nepal went with structured agendas and returned with measurable follow-up.
For Nepal, engagement with both neighbours is unavoidable. But Nepal does not lack diplomatic visits. What it lacks is a visible system of responsibilities, timelines and measurable action after those visits.
This matters especially for a government that came to power promising a break from old politics. Prime Minister Balendra Shah has appeared determined to introduce a more controlled diplomatic style, with greater emphasis on protocol, institutional channels, and state-led engagement with foreign diplomats. Indeed, Nepal needs a professional diplomatic culture. State-to-state relations must be conducted through institutions, records, protocol, and national priorities.
But protocol alone is not diplomacy. Protocol may protect dignity, but only a structured agenda protects national interest. The timing of the visits made this clearer. Before them, the government was already under diplomatic scrutiny. The Prime Minister's reported remarks on Nepal-India border issues created controversy, including debate over encroachment and the possible role of British-era historical records. Later clarifications said Nepal was not seeking third-party mediation. By then, however, the remarks had triggered debate inside Nepal and a response from India rejecting third-party involvement.
Against this background, RSP president Rabi Lamichhane's visit to India, followed by the Foreign Minister's official visits to India and China, deserves closer assessment.
The India visit provided an opportunity to reassure India that Nepal's new political style would remain within responsible statecraft, while shifting the conversation towards practical areas such as trade, investment, connectivity, energy, and people-to-people relations. The China visit also mattered.
After visible engagement with India, outreach to Beijing was necessary to communicate continuity, balance, and respect for Nepal's northern neighbour. It covered broad areas including infrastructure, connectivity, trade, investment, tourism, agriculture, energy, technology, digitalisation, and implementation of past agreements.
Both visits had value. They kept channels open, reduced uncertainty, and introduced the new government's external posture. But the central question remains: were they guided by sufficiently structured and mutually understood agendas, or were they useful but broadly framed diplomatic engagements with limited public evidence of follow-up?
The public record shows broad agendas, selected outputs, and general commitments. For India, the stated areas included trade, investment, connectivity, energy, and people-to-people ties. Later remarks referred to digital cooperation, cross-border payment systems, educational partnerships, emerging technologies, artificial intelligence, and regional language technologies. For China, the public record referred to cooperation across infrastructure, connectivity, border management, energy, trade, investment, agriculture, technology transfer, digitalisation, tourism and people-to-people relations, along with commitment to implement past programmes and projects.
These are important. But broad themes, selected outputs and general commitments are not the same as a publicly disclosed follow-up plan. The available public record does not yet show a structured action matrix for either visit identifying responsible agencies, counterpart institutions, timelines, and measurable next steps. That gap is precisely why Nepal needs agenda-led diplomacy.
A serious high-level diplomatic visit should answer five questions before departure. What exactly does Nepal want from each visit? Has the agenda been discussed and broadly agreed with the other side? Which issues are ready for decision, technical review, or political signalling? Who will follow up after return? How will the Parliament and citizens know whether the visit produced results?
For India, broad discussion must become concrete workstreams: power trade, market access, customs facilitation, digital payments, border infrastructure, air routes, and the practical needs of Nepalis in India. Border issues should be handled through evidence, institutions, and disciplined language.
For China, the same discipline is needed. If trade deficit, tourism, infrastructure or past agreements are raised, Nepal must identify priority actions, assess viability, understand delays and assign responsibility.
The Foreign Minister's visits should therefore begin a new standard in which every major foreign visit produces a post-visit action matrix. Such a matrix need not disclose sensitive details. But it should list issues discussed, responsible Nepali agencies, counterpart institutions, next steps, timelines, and matters requiring further negotiation. This is how diplomacy becomes governance.
Older parties also conducted foreign visits, issued statements, and signed agreements that often remained unimplemented. The RSP-led government should not repeat that culture with new faces.
Nepal needs to engage India with confidence, China with clarity, and both neighbours from the standpoint of national interest. What weakens Nepal is not engagement with either neighbour, but engagement without preparation, statements without discipline, and visits without follow-up.
The future test of Nepal's diplomacy should not be whether leaders are received warmly in New Delhi or Beijing. The test should be whether visits were based on agreed agendas, commitments were followed up, and citizens saw results after the delegation returned.
Ghale is a former member of the WHO Governance Team in Geneva with an interest in governance, policy, and diplomacy