Birendra P Mishra

A three-member UN team has arrived to assess the prevailing political and security conditions in Nepal. Although Secretary General Kofi Annan has been showing his concern about Nepal from time to time, this team will succeed in breaking the political deadlock which has resulted not only in taking away thousands of precious lives, but also caused suffering to millions of innocent people. In spite of the army’s best efforts, it is difficult to defeat the Maoists who have control over most of the rural areas. It is, therefore, an opportune time for the UN to take the lead in ending the impasse to eliminate the sufferings of the people and save Nepal from becoming a failed state.

The UN has played a laudable role in solving the problems of El Salvador, which had faced almost similar problems in the 1980s like Nepal. According to Robert C Olli’s article “Building peace in El Salvador: From Exception to Rule, the history of the civil war in El Salvador that began in 1979 can be traced back to 1932. During the war about 80,000 Salvadoreans were killed, over half a million people were internally displaced, and over one million sought refuge in the US and other countries. Its economy was devastated.

There were several root causes of the armed conflict. First, there was serious socio-economic inequality and poverty. Secondly, there was the lack of political space for dissent and opposition as elections were held without any participation of the left parties. Thirdly, there was highly skewed land tenure for many in the agrarian sector. Over one-third of the population was comprised of landless peasants. Fourthly, there were the massive human rights abuse and absence of justice. By 1983, about 40,000 people were killed. Freedom of press, speech and association were curtailed. The legal system had virtually collapsed due to intimidation and corruption in judiciary. Naturally, people were forced to resort to arms.

The fifth cause cropped up later on. Active international support for the war started coming in, as the Reagan administration believed that the conflict was the result of a global Communist campaign coordinated by Havana and Moscow. It extended economic aid and military support to the tune of $3.3 million and $4.2 billion by the end of the war. Nicaragua and Cuba, in return, started supporting the FMLN, the liberation front, with arms, logistics and political backing. The sixth cause came gradually in the form of a profound militarising of Salvadoran society. The army’s strength increased from less than 10,000 in 1979 to 63,000 in the mid- to late-80s. Local government failed. The economy became dependent on massive inflows of US assistance tied to war. Finally, a war culture developed, both inside and outside the conflict zones.

The situation changed drastically with the end of the cold war which poured water on the fire of war as the FMLN’ outside support from Cuba and Nicaragua began to dry on the one hand, and the Bush administration lost interest in the military support to the government, on the other. Negotiated settlement started taking a shape with the initiation of regional peace effort by Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela in 1983. After failing in their peace efforts in 1987, they ultimately requested the UN to facilitate the process.

For over two years, the UN facilitated designing agreements to end armed conflict by political means. It was the most ambitious UN peace building efforts, as it was responsible not only for verifying the accords but also for mediating between the parties. The government had to sign various agreements for demobilising the FMLN’s forces in phases, safeguarding human rights, reforming constitution, stipulating subordination of the armed forces to civilian authority, ensuring free and fair polls and establishing a “Truth Commission” to investigate violence for bringing about reconciliation. Other agreements were also signed for creating a representative National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ) to downsize and reform the armed forces, promoting integration of belligerent groups through the transfer of land in conflict zones. Within 12 months of the signing of the Chapultepec accords, the FMLN’s 8,000 forces were disarmed and fully demobilised. The size of the military was reduced to 17,000. The armed forces were duty-bound only to defend the sovereignty of the state. After disbanding the national police, the job of public security was assigned to a newly created National Civilian Police. The force was to be comprised of 20 per cent former guerrillas, 20 per cent former military, and 60 per cent new recruits. Politically, in 1994, 1997 and 1999 elections, the former guerrillas and their supporters became the second largest party in the legislature and won 53 municipal elections.

Although all the problems were not solved, the chances of returning to war in El Salvador are very remote. It is advisable to learn lessons from El Salvador and take help from the UN.

Prof Mishra is a former election commissioner