March has been a bad month for the worldâ€™s multilateralists who, encouraged by several early appointments to the State Department and a successful presidential tour of Europe, had hoped that President Bush would temper his unilateralist instincts in his second term. But culminating in Fridayâ€™s release by the Pentagon of a new â€œNational Defence Strategy of the USAâ€, the last few weeks have showered a bracing dose of cold water on that notion.
Combined with the nomination earlier in the month of super-unilateralist John Bolton as Bushâ€™s ambassador to the UN, as well as the US withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for cases involving the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the Strategy suggests that US interest in its traditional alliances, multilateral institutions, and international law is on a downward trajectory.
The 24-page public document, signed by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, is designed to lay out some of the basic assumptions of the US role in the world, particularly as regards peace and security, that will guide the Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR), an important exercise carried out every four years that steers US strategy, the Pentagonâ€™s more than $400 billion annual budget, and military â€œtransformationâ€ over the next five to 10 years.
While the New York Times highlighted one suggested innovation â€” inviting foreign allies into classified discussions on the QDR as it is developed â€” as evidence of greater collegiality and openness to allies, the Strategy puts far greater stress on the critical importance of retaining Washingtonâ€™s independence and its unchallengeable military dominance in strategic regions.
While the first of four â€œstrategic objectivesâ€ listed in the report is securing the US from direct attack, the second is to â€œsecure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.â€ â€œStrengthen(ing) alliances and partnershipsâ€ rates number three. At another point, it warns that â€œsome enemies may seek to terrorise our population and destroy our way of life, while others will try to ....limit our global freedom to act...â€ In dramatic contrast to the National Security Strategy of the USA released in September 2002 the latest strategy does not even mention the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), except obliquely by the phrase â€œtraditional alliesâ€ or â€œpartnersâ€, suggesting a strong preference for ad hoc â€œcoalitions of the willingâ€,.
Several other aspects of the Strategy also suggest a growing wariness of, if not hostility to, multinational mechanisms and international law. Under â€œvulnerabilities,â€ for example, the Strategy notes, â€œOur strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism.â€ While the outgoing undersecretary of defence for policy, Douglas Feith, stressed that the provision was not intended to equate proponents of international law with terrorists, he made clear that Washington will resist attempts to submit it to treaties that it has not ratified, such as the Rome Protocol for ICC.
The document also makes clear that US intends to ignore or demand changes in international law if they constrain Washingtonâ€™s freedom of action. â€œMany of the current legal arrangements that govern overseas posture date from an earlier era,â€ it states. â€œToday, challenges are more diverse and complex, our prospective contingencies are more widely dispersed, and our international partners are more numerous. â€œInternational agreements relevant to our posture must support greater operational flexibility. They must help, not hinder, the rapid deployment and employment of US and coalition forces worldwide in a crisis,â€ it goes on, adding, for example, that legal protections for US personnel aga-inst possible transfer to the ICC, the tribunal for crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes, will continue to be sought.
The Strategy also reiterates Bushâ€™s strategic doctrine of â€œpre-emption,â€ particularly in the case of a â€œpotentially catastrophic impact of an attack against the US, its allies and its interests,â€ a phrase that, significantly, did not qualify its application to situations in which such an attack was â€œimminent.â€ Similarly, the Strategy calls for â€œpreventiveâ€ military action by the US and its partners, citing, as an example, â€œto prevent the outbreak of hostilities or to help defend or restore a friendly government. Under the most dangerous and compelling circumstances, prevention might require the use of force to disable or destroy (weapons of mass destruction) in the possession of terrorists or others or to strike targets that direct threaten the US or US friends or other interests.â€
The Strategy suggests that Washington will not be reluctant to send its forces into other states that, in its opinion, do not â€œexercise their sovereignty responsiblyâ€ or that â€œuse the principle of sovereignty as a shield behind which they claim to be free to engage in activities that pose enormous threats to their citizens, neighbours, or the rest of the international community.â€ US freedom of action, which the document asserts, will provide a stabilising influence in key regionsâ€, must also be assured â€œin and from the global commons, including space and cyberspace, as well as international waters and airspace.
â€œKey goals ...are to ensure our access to and use of space, and to deny hostile exploitation of space to adversaries,â€ the document states. â€” IPS