Ayaz Amir

Trying to change the thinking of Pakistan’s geo-strategic warriors must rank as one of the more difficult intellectual undertakings in the Third World. This thinking gave us the doctrine of strategic depth in Afghanistan and that of jihad in Kashmir. When under the threat of Bush’s ultimatum our military command ditched the Taliban, ‘strategic depth’ straightaway flew into the trashcan of history. Any government with its wits about it would have ditched the Taliban and its medievalism long before September 11.

Pakistan’s rulers, especially those gifted to the nation through coups and other constitutional innovations, have honed the talent of not doing the right thing at the right time. If, occasionally, they have done the right thing it has not been on their own, or on the basis of their own thinking, but as a result of outside pressure. So it has been with jihad.

India could be bled up to a point but not forced to the negotiating table. Nor could the status quo be altered. So what was the Pakistan army trying to achieve? No one knows, not even the masterminds of this policy. After these debacles you would probably expect some sense of contrition among the samurai who have been afflicting their geo-strategic theories on a hapless nation. For 20 years in the case of Afghanistan and for 15 for Kashmir they promoted policies whose bankruptcy is now proven.

But this being the hallowed world of the Pakistani samurai no questions will be asked. There is a school of thought which says Musharraf should be commended for his boldness, applauded for taking the bull of extremism by the horns. Firstly, no bull of any kind is being taken by the horns. Jihad may be on the verge of being wrapped up but on the political front Musharraf has jumped into bed with the nearest thing Pakistan has to the Taliban, the mullahs of the MMA. What kind of a modern republic can such an alliance portend? Secondly, the decisions now being taken should have been taken four years ago.

This is not hairsplitting. The mother of all Pakistan’s problems is the military’s shadow on every aspect of national life. Unless this shadow recedes Pakistan will not find the holy grail of an enduring democracy. It’s not a question in bad taste but one going to the heart of our predicament: suppose, God forbid, either of the two assassination attempts on Musharraf had succeeded? Who would have stepped into Musharraf’s shoes? Is this the stability we have achieved in four years?

Another thing: what’s happening to our nuclear programme? Musharraf says only a traitor would roll it back. Reassuring words but what’s the reality on the ground? Two top officials of the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) which gave Pakistan its uranium-enrichment capability have been picked up for questioning in connection with charges that rogue elements in Pakistan’s nuclear community may have sold, “for personal gain”, nuclear secrets to Iran. Both officials are close associates of Dr A Q Khan, the father of Pakistan’s uranium-enrichment programme. Until removed by Musharraf, Khan was everything in KRL. To suggest therefore that someone in KRL was involved in trading nuclear secrets is to point the finger of blame directly at Khan himself. It also amounts to confirming the western view that Pakistan is an ‘irresponsible’ nuclear power and that its secrets/weapons could fall into the wrong hands.

Conclusion: (1)Pakistan has not been made stronger by the parliamentary endorsement given to Musharraf’s rule. Its polity remains as fragile as ever. (2) All our history teaches us that a civilian not a military dispensation is the best guardian of what we choose to call the national interest. Can the military be expected to heed this lesson? To judge by the past, the answer is no.

Ayaz, a columnist for Dawn, writes for THT from Islamabad