The strategy that US president George Bush outlined last Wednesday does not represent an altogether new approach to Iraq, but a necessary adaptation of the previous strategy to changed circumstances. It is, in effect, an updating of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq he issued in November 2005. President Bush’s prime-time address acknowledged the shortcomings of past efforts to secure Baghdad. And he implied that this new effort to do so represents a final opportunity to salvage victory in Iraq. Failure in Iraq, he warned, would be a disaster. But Bush’s plan can work.

Strategy is the interplay of ends, ways, and means. Strategic thinking implies limited means. There are never enough resources to achieve all goals, so choices must be made concerning how best to apply limited resources. In the case of Iraq, America’s strategic goal is a “unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, sustain itself, and is an ally in the war on terror.”

The key to achieving this strategic goal is to provide security for the Iraqi people. This, in turn, requires defeating the insurgents. Until February of last year, the key to victory was the defeat of the Sunni insurgency centred in Anbar Province. This took the form of a campaign to destroy the Sunni insurgency by depriving it of its base in the Sunni Triangle and its “ratlines” — the infiltration routes that run from the Syrian border into the heart of Iraq. The main reason for the so-called surge is to provide enough troops to provide security for Baghdad while regaining the initiative against the Sunni fighters in Anbar. It also recognises that the Shiite militias causing most of the deaths in Baghdad must be neutralised. It includes not only a military component but political and economic elements, as well.

The adage — to defeat an insurgency, “win the hearts and minds” of the people — is true. But to do that, the people must have security. And to achieve security, it is often necessary to kill and capture the insurgents. Thus, military success is a necessary, if not sufficient, cause for defeating an insurgency. Will Bush’s approach work? This depends on at least three factors.

The first is the adequacy of the force. Many commentators have called for troop increases of 40,000 to 50,000, but 20,000, which President Bush called for, is the maximum number that can be culled from the current force. In any case, the key to success is not the number of troops but how they are used.

The second factor is the Iraqi government. Until now, the Shiite militias have been off limits. That has to change, and Bush put Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on notice that this is the case. The third factor is Congress. Would the Democrats rather see Bush lose or the United States win? Let us hope that the Democrats take the wise counsel of one of their own, Sen. Joe Lieberman of Connecticut, who reminded us the other day that the stark choice in Iraq is between victory and defeat. — The Christian Science Monitor