US difficulties in Iraq and the “surge” of American forces into Baghdad raise again the important question: When does terrorism succeed or fail? Neither Robert Gates, the new secretary of Defence, nor the Iraq Study Group have provided an answer.

Many conclude that terrorism almost invariably succeeds. But this response does not distinguish between two different situations. Among established governments, provincial terrorism designed to divide the mother country into separate parts has largely failed. National self-determination foisted by terrorists is coming to an end. But terrorism directed against foreign intervention has frequently succeeded and may continue to do so.

The record of terrorist failures is long and instructive. Despite inflicting terror on Russia and Ingushetia, Chechen insurgents have not won independence from Russia. Though threatened by terrorism, the central governments of Britain, Indonesia, and India have not conceded to terrorists in their midst. The IRA in Northern Ireland has abandoned terror tactics.

Radical Basques still support ETA and its terror campaign, but most of Spain rejects it. Canada has not heeded the demands of some Quebeckers for independence, and the Parti Quebecois bears no resemblance to the old and discredited actions of the FLQ.

Sri Lanka is not likely to break apart, and most Sri Lankans don’t support the extremist tactics of the separatist Tamil Tigers. In each case, dissidents have undermined their legitimacy by resorting to mass killings, extortion, and suicide bombings.

But countries that intervene into the domestic affairs of other states confront a different and

more successful form of terrorism or insurgency. That’s because intervention most often destroys the very government and political class that occupiers need as a rebuilding partner. The key variable leading to success is getting an effective central government that controls sticks and carrots to sway the insurgents. Applying this to Iraq, the United States needs a different and stronger Iraqi regime, not beholden to one camp.

In Afghanistan’s case, the loya jirga meeting in Bonn fashioned a balanced regime in Kabul that most of the country accepted. That structure has helped the country make important strides in recent years. But because United States resources have been overwhelmingly spent in Iraq, the Afghan government has few carrots or sticks. Afghanistan still faces major security challenges, and greater military and economic assistance must play a part in overcoming them.

But unlike in Iraq, the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the Afghans themselves have created an inclusive political environment that encourages violent extremists to become political stakeholders. Whatever happens in Iraq, the US, its allies, and the Afghan people can still unite Afghanistan and make its government reflect the desires of the nation. — The Christian Science Monitor