The Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral dialogue, originally conceived by Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov in the late 1990s, was designed to foster Eurasian solidarity and promote a multipolar world order in response to US-led Western dominance. Bringing together three of Asia's most influential powers – Russia, India and China – the RIC aimed to provide a platform for discussing strategic, economic and security issues outside the framework of Western alliances.

Over the years, however, the RIC has oscillated between engagement and dormancy, especially afterseveral border clashes between India and China. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's recent call to revive the RIC reflects Moscow's intent to counterbalance Western-led coalitions such as NATO and AUKUS, which has received a green light from Beijing and a measure of openness from New Delhi.

For South Asia, the revival of the RIC carries both promising opportunities and significant risks for global affairs and regional stability.

When RIC was first envisioned, Russia was recovering from the post-Soviet collapse, China was an emerging but not yet assertive economy and India was pursuing strategic autonomy in a US-dominated unipolar world. Today, the geopolitical landscape is far more complex. The US-China rivalry, Russia's isolation due to the Ukraine war and India's deepening ties with the US through frameworks like the QUAD have reshaped the trilateral dynamic. Yet, India continues to engage with both Russia and China through platforms like BRICS Plus, the SCO and AIIB, reflecting its balancing strategy.

A key benefit of reviving RIC lies in its potential to enable dialogue between India and China, despite ongoing tensions. Since the Galwan Valley clash and Operations Sindoor, both countries have hardened positions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), while India-Pakistan tensions persist along the Line of Control (LoC). In this context, RIC offers a valuable informal mechanism for communication, crisis management and de-escalation – vital for regional stability.

The RIC embodies a vision of multipolarity that appeals to many South Asian nations often overlooked in Western-led global governance. If focussed on economic cooperation and connectivity, RIC could drive regional growth through investments in transport, energy and digital infrastructure, boosting trade, jobs and integration with Eurasian and East Asian markets.

On the security front, RIC's shared opposition to terrorism and separatism offers a platform for joint action against militancy and organised crime. Amid growing US-China rivalry, RIC could act as a non-aligned buffer, helping South Asia avoid becoming a proxy arena in great-power competition.

However, despite its potential, the RIC cannot easily overcome the deep strategic mistrust between India and China. China's close ties with Pakistan continue to be major irritants for New Delhi. Coupled with China's assertive territorial claims and strategic ambitions, the RIC risks becoming a forum for rhetoric rather than reconciliation.

RIC decisions risk marginalising smaller South Asian nations such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. If their interests are overlooked or undermined, these countries may turn to alternative patrons to safeguard their sovereignty, potentially disrupting the regional balance.India, in particular, faces a strategic dilemma in balancing its growing ties with the US and its allies and participating in the RIC. An India preoccupied with managing conflicting commitments may, thus, find it difficult to maintain its traditional role as a stabilising force in South Asia.

Moreover, strengthening the RIC could allow China to expand its influence in the region at India's expense. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has already established significant economic and strategic footholds across South Asia. A more empowered China within the RIC framework could further tip the regional balance, intensifying the India-China rivalry instead of alleviating it.

Finally, the revival of the RIC could trigger countermeasures from the United States and its allies, potentially accelerating the militarisation of South Asia. The region is already witnessing increased naval deployments, arms buildups and expanding defense partnerships as part of the broader Indo-Pacific competition. A more active RIC may heighten tensions and make the region even more vulnerable to external interference.

The revitalisation of the RIC has significant strategic implications. One, it challenges the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy by prompting a reassessment of India's role as a long-term counterweight to China. Two, it could evolve into a de-dollarisation and sanctions-resilient bloc, aligning with BRICS Plus goals. Three, it may shift global governance narratives towards multipolarity, non-interference and Global South solidarity, thereby diluting U.S. normative influence in multilateral institutions. Fourth, RIC could complement the SCO in military and security rebalancing, potentially expanding India's cooperation in areas like space, maritime security, border management and regional diplomacy in Central Asia, the Arctic and the Indian Ocean.

India's effort to maintain strategic autonomy – as a bridge between North-South cooperation – signals resistance to U.S. pressure on issues like tech decoupling and China containment. It also suggests a possible recalibration of frameworks like the QUAD, I2U2 (India-Israel-UAE-USA) and defense agreements such as LEMOA, COMCASA and BECA.

Ultimately, South Asia's stability hinges not only on the RIC's success as a dialogue platform but also on its ability to reconcile internal differences without marginalising smaller nations.

Basnyat, a Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, is a strategic analyst