The current debate over the utility of the $500 million grant proffered by the US under the Millennium Challenge Cooperation (MCC) initiative is the predominant topic in Nepal.

Politically loaded, it has created a vertical division in civil society and polarised public opinion to a needless extent, creating a state of strategic paralysis.

Related Articles

MCC grant agreement: Don't twist facts

Malan soaks up the moment as England rally at the Gabba

The inability to make a simple judgment call underscores the absence of driving and resolute leadership.

A leadership lacking the will and capacity to conduct a simple structured debate to determine a choice.

Choices on the other hand are a set of options that offer a way out from this malaise. Particularly, a rational choice that results in outcomes favourable to one's own best interests.

Rational choices in turn grow and transform into a strategic choice, a term bearing significant connotations concerning national security.

Unfortunately, in our case, the gravity of the term 'strategic' and the significance of its overarching embrace is often trivialised or over stated. Extrapolating along the same line, debates are generally understood as informed and formal discussions, whereas arguments are thought of as a yelling match or negative discussion, synonymous to disagreement and a war of words – analogous to tricks with language that allow the ignorant to appear wise and knowledgeable.

The events that forge contemporary issues and the dynamics that drive the controversies over the MCC are externally and internally generated, a consequence of epoch changes in international and national politics.

It is also an implicit qualification of the belief that politics determines and organises all other aspects of statecraft. However, it is not the only element of statecraft.

Therefore, an objective approach in grappling the predicament of halfbaked strategies– an obvious case of mismatch between the means available and ways utilised to achieve a desired end – would logically result in positive outcomes.

The uncertain geopolitical environment – stacked with dense allusions – has placed the nation on the horns of a dilemma. One could draw parallels to a famous Shakespearean tragedy where, in a state of utter despondence, the central character in a soliloquy utters the famous declaration, 'to be or not to be'.

However, we are not living in a Shakespearean world but a real 'Hobbesian' world. To elaborate further, a "Kautilyan" world where big fish eat the small. It is a world where a sophisticated 'Weltanschauung' or world view is an imperative.

Furthermore, as a student of military history, a lesson that I have imbibed over the years is that without a basic understanding of how the present has evolved through a historical perspective concerning the uniqueness of a nation's position, our so-called strategists have no way of understanding where they stand and, therefore, where to go.

The process of policy and strategy formulation followed by decision-making is greatly hampered by an unreflective and intellectually indifferent attitude, prevalent among a large segment of our scholarly fraternity. As a consequence, what really matters is mundanely glossed over.

The essence of good strategy is based upon the foundations of a comprehensive appraisal of the environment.

A process best expressed colloquially by the Chinese military philosopher, Sun Tzu, "know your enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles".

Thus, a realistic understanding of the extent and limits of our national power – a fundamental force that motors statecraft – needs to be determined in time to sail through rough waters.

Being a realist at heart, I believe that the modern world has hidden much of reality underneath a veneer of civilisation. A reality based on a pessimistic view of human nature that Hobbes described as a "general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of Power after Power, that ceaseth only in death".

Caught in a triangular joust between three sometimes cooperating but mostly competing world powers, we are undoubtedly in an unenviable position.

A position more precarious than the island of Melos caught in a conflict between two major powers, Athens the rising power and Sparta the incumbent.

The Melians argued that by the law of nations they had a right to remain neutral in the conflict, whereas the Athenians argued that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must and went ahead to raze Melos to the ground.

In making choices regarding the MCC project, in my opinion, you can either choose to be a nationalist or a patriot. Choose to uphold an abstract concept of sovereignty in pursuit of interests or defend the nation to fight against the scourge of poverty, inequality and ignorance.

Nevertheless, in making a choice one must comprehend the gravity of the situation and fathom the subtle nuances between a strategic and tactical choice.

For policy formulators, the choice embraced is going to determine the contours of the strategy adopted.

However, a word of caution to our statesmen.

Sound and balanced strategies are structured to adapt readily to evolving environments. Even so, history is strewn with examples of flawed strategies that were difficult to adapt because by the time the consequences of a bad choice was realised, it was too late by then to alter course because of political consequences.

At the end of the day, whether good or bad, all choices are drivers of change. They bring with them instability, as comfort zones are threatened and provide acceleration to progress. Procrastination in making a choice on the other hand is a negative marker that leads to cumulative debilitation in all arenas of statecraft.

Therefore, the way ahead is to grab the bull by the horns and act boldly fully cognizant of the pitfalls along the way. A lesson from my past and a tribute to my platoon Sergeant Major at Sandhurst, follow the 6P formula all the way, which is .....Prior Proper Planning Prevents Poor Performance.