Testing times for Gen Musharraf
Sixty years old this August, Pakistan has been under military rule for exactly half of its life. Military leaders have usually been limited to a 10-year cycle: Ayub Khan (1958-69), Zia-ul-Haq (1977-89). The first was removed by a nationwide
insurrection, the second assassinated. According to this political calendar, Pervez Musharraf still has a year and a half to go, but events happen.
Last month the president suspended the chief justice of the Supreme Court. Unlike some of his colleagues, Iftikhar Chaudhry didn’t resign at the time of the coup but, like previous supreme courts, acquiesced to the bogus “doctrine of necessity” used to judicially justify a military takeover. The charges against him now are related to a “corrupt misuse of office”, but it’s hardly a secret that Chaudhry’s recent judgments against the government, including the demand that “disappeared” political activists be produced in court, panicked Islamabad. Might this turbulent judge go so far as to declare the military presidency unconstitutional? Paranoia set in. TV stations were raided, destroying the regime’s boast that it interfered less with the media than its predecessors.
The decision triggered off a remarkable social movement. Initially confined to the country’s 80,000 lawyers and several dozen judges, it was a defence of judicial independence against
the executive. As respect for the movement grew, bandwagon careerists from the opposition made the cause their own.
Musharraf and his advisers decided on a test of strength. The judge was due to visit Karachi, where political power rests with the MQM, an unsavoury outfit addicted to violence and protection rackets. On Islamabad’s instructions, MQM leaders decided to prevent the judge from addressing any meeting in Karachi. That led to armed clashes and nearly 50 deaths in the city, which provoked a general strike, isolating the regime. Were a presidential election to be held today, no doubt the judge would defeat the general.
Choudhry’s popularity can only be understood in a context where traditional politicians had become thoroughly discredited. First, Benazir Bhutto’s failure to do anything substantial for the poor who had voted for her resulted in mass disillusion. She was removed from office allegedly for corruption, and in the subsequent elections her old rival Nawaz Sharif won a large majority on a turnout of less than 30%. Sharif made his brother Shahbaz chief minister of Punjab. His father became the country’s unofficial president. He advised his sons that generals could be bought and sold. But not all of them. Sharif’s attempt to retire Musharraf backfired, and the general took charge in 1999.
The 9/11 attacks made the Pakistan president a key player in the region. Money began to pour in, nuclear-related sanctions were lifted, and the EU granted trade concessions. As the US became more closely involved, the Pakistani military and political elite fell into line. For a while the only opposition to the regime came from the Islamists, moderates and extremists alike.
The attempt to browbeat a judge has opened a new fissure in Pakistan, where elections are expected within the year. There is an easy solution. The general should discard his uniform, the judge should forgo his wig and the two should battle it out on the electoral terrain. — The Guardian