South Asia balks for lack of UN sanction

M B Naqvi

The US government’s renewal of an earlier request to India, Pakistan and Bangladesh to send troops to Iraq has been made necessary by the turn of recent events in that country, aflame with attacks against the occupying forces. These three South Asian countries are among the ones that usually contribute troops in fair numbers for peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. Why these countries have not responded positively so far is because of the doubtful legality of last year’s invasion of Iraq. All three countries have not found it a legally legitimate war that could be approved by the UN.

Their stance was, and remains, that unless the UN Security Council passes another resolution accepting the peacekeeping in Iraq, it will not be possible for them to send their troops there. One circumstance makes the new request embarrassing for all three governments: the painful sequel to last year’s Iraq war has meant that maintaining US occupation there involves a very high cost in lives and US treasure.

On Wednesday, an attack south of Basra is said to have killed three Iraqis and wounded four British soldiers. A series of three bomb attacks outside police stations in Basra, southern Iraq killed at least 68 people. Attacks against US troops continue in Fallujah, west of Baghdad.

Sending troops under today’s conditions is likely to be opposed by a wide swath of opinion as helping an immoral operation of the US, because the morality of the Iraq war continues to be widely questioned more than one year into the US-led occupation. The UN had refused to authorise it.

For India, the issue cannot be decided until after the four-stage general election that started on April 20 and concludes May 10.

For now, there remain two uncertainties for Indian decision-making on the subject. One is the absence of UN cover for the operation. There is as yet no certainty because it will depend on what the US government concedes to the UN in terms of international law. Complex issues need to be settled about the future government of Iraq, the status of US forces in Iraq and the precise functions the UN is expected to perform. The second uncertainty is more complex. One part is formal: who really knows for sure who will win in the Indian polls.

While there is sure to be a lot of continuity with the policies of the preceding government, there are sure to be differences of nuances. The Congress party is sure to be somewhat more reluctant to send troops to an Iraq with which India has had a long record of friendship. But it is sure to accept India’s strategic partnership with the US also, though with a tad less enthusiasm than the ruling BJP showed. Thus the Indian attitude is sure to be theoretically helpful toward the US government. The legality of peacekeeping in a chaotic Iraq will certainly, if it persists, be questioned. Much of actual Indian attitude will be shaped by what the UN Security Council decides about the US-led occupation.

In Bangladesh, Dhaka’s decision-makers will be less inhibited in helping the US government — their traditional friend and donor — though the issues of international law will have as much relevance to Dhaka as to New Delhi. Moreover, public opinion in Bangladesh is divided: the opposition Awami League does tend to take a more sympathetic view on the US concerns. But on occasions the other major party, the governing Bangladesh Nationalist Party, can beat the Awami League in the friendliness of its approach to the US.

But as it is constituted, the government contains religiously oriented Islamic parties and its sympathies today are wholly anti-US. The overall climate of opinion there, thanks to the influence of radical left in its literature and day-to-day discourse, is non-friendly to US aims. But it is true that if the Foggy Bottom can obtain a fig leaf of legality Dhaka will have no difficulty in contributing two brigades of troops or so.

On the whole, New Delhi too can be seen — if US Secretary of State Colin Powell manages to obtain a new UN peacekeeping resolution on Iraq — to be ready to send 10,000 or so troops for the sake of its strategic ally. Pakistan’s case is different. President Musharraf is the fulcrum on which Pakistan-US friendship turns and he is perhaps the most pro-US politician in South Asia. He has earned for Pakistan the dubious honour of being a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ally.

He is perhaps anxious to please the US government. But he has unseen shackles on his political feet: his power base is the army and it is largely pro-US. But his effective allies in politics are nobodies in leading any significant section of the population. Worse, he still depends on Islamist parties for major political decisions. Islamist parties, to no one’s surprise, are viscerally anti-US despite their past close cooperation with the US. Musharraf’s administration is embattled, fighting al-Qaeda and Taliban fugitives from Afghanistan hiding in the mountain fastnesses of Pakistan’s tribal areas.

The Pakistan government, due to rampant anti-US sentiment, denies that it has agreed

to send 10,000 troops to Iraq. It has again reiterated that Pakistan cannot contribute troops

for consolidating the US occupation of Iraq and shall only let troops go there under a UN-approved peacekeeping operation. Some Islamabad newspapers say that a Pakistan army contingent is all set to go to Iraq in a few months. — IPS